Richard Todd Robards v. State of Florida
214 So. 3d 568
| Fla. | 2017Background
- Robards was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (2006 deaths of Frank and Linda Deluca) and sentenced to death after a jury recommended death 7–5 and the trial judge imposed death following Spencer hearings.
- Trial evidence included Robards’ fingerprints/DNA linking him to the scene, his planning and knowledge of the Delucas’ safe, and post-offense conduct removing the safe; substantial aggravators (prior violent felony, pecuniary gain/robbery, HAC) were found by the court.
- During guilt phase the State admitted a voicemail from Robards to Detective Monte saying “if you guys are ready to make a deal, come in and talk to me,” which the defense did not object to at trial.
- Robards raised postconviction claims under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, including ineffective assistance of guilt-phase counsel for not objecting to the voicemail, ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel for failing to investigate/present mental-health mitigation, and Hurst-related error due to a nonunanimous 7–5 jury recommendation.
- The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing, denied relief on all claims, and Robards appealed; the Florida Supreme Court affirmed denial of the guilt-phase IAC claim but vacated the death sentences and remanded for a new penalty-phase under Hurst.
Issues
| Issue | Robards' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to voicemail/statement as inadmissible plea negotiations | Voicemail and conversation with Detective Monte were offer-to-deal communications and should have been excluded; failure to preserve is deficient | Statement was not plea negotiation given totality (unsolicited voicemail, jail call, unrelated drug arrest) and was admissible as party admission; no deficient performance or prejudice | Affirmed denial: counsel not ineffective because statement was not a plea negotiation and, even if objectionable, admission was harmless given overwhelming guilt evidence (Strickland not met) |
| Whether Hurst requires vacatur/remand where jury recommended death 7–5 and judge made findings | Robards: nonunanimous recommendation and lack of jury findings on sufficiency of aggravators/weighting violates Sixth Amendment per Hurst, requiring new penalty phase | State: error may be harmless; judge found aggravators and weighed mitigation; or Hurst not applicable/harmless here | Vacated death sentences and remanded for new penalty phase: Hurst error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given nonunanimous 7–5 recommendation and lack of requisite jury findings |
| Whether penalty-phase counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate/present substantial mental-health mitigation | Robards: counsel had records and leads (medical/psychiatric records, PET scan, abuse history) but failed to investigate/present mitigation to jury, prejudicing penalty outcome | State: (not fully addressed by majority because Hurst relief granted) | Not decided on merits by majority (declined to address because Hurst relief granted); concurrence emphasized strong evidence of penalty-phase IAC supporting need for new penalty phase |
| Whether cumulative errors require relief | Robards: combined errors deprived him of fair trial/penalty phase | State: cumulative error not shown / harmless | Not addressed by majority due to Hurst-based remand; claim left unresolved |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (Sixth Amendment requires jury, not judge, to find facts necessary for death sentence)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court: jury must unanimously find aggravators sufficient, that aggravators outweigh mitigation, and recommendation must be unanimous)
- Robards v. State, 112 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 2013) (direct appeal opinion describing trial record, jury 7–5 recommendation, and prior review of claims)
- Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016) (Hurst applies retroactively to defendants whose sentences became final after Ring)