Richard S. Lehman v. Margarita Arias Piza, 727 F.3d 1326

Background

Richard Lehman, longtime attorney and executor for decedent Wilson C. Lucom, alleged the Arias family and associates engaged in a scheme (bribes, false criminal charges/denuncias, sham litigation, transfers of estate property) to seize Lucom’s estate and defeat Lehman’s control.
Lucom’s 2005 will left the bulk of his (then ~$50M, now much larger) estate to a Panamanian children’s foundation; Lehman was appointed executor in Panama and for ancillary administration in Florida; Hilda Arias later challenged and succeeded in being declared sole executor in Panama.
From 2006–2009 Lehman was subject to Panamanian criminal accusations, Interpol action, publicity, and Florida probate litigation that resulted in a 2009 surcharge judgment against him; Lehman spent substantial personal funds defending the estate.
Lehman filed an abuse-of-process complaint in Florida in January 2007 and then filed a civil RICO complaint on September 23, 2011 alleging the Arias Group’s pattern of racketeering to steal estate assets.
The district court converted motions to dismiss into summary judgment and held Lehman’s RICO claims time-barred by RICO’s four-year statute of limitations, concluding Lehman knew (or should have known) of his RICO injuries by January–September 2007.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying the "separate accrual" rule and concluding the post-2007 acts alleged were continuations or reaffirmations of earlier acts, not new and independent injuries that would restart the limitations period.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Lehman’s RICO claims are timely under RICO’s 4‑year statute of limitations using the separate accrual rule	Lehman contends at least some predicate acts and resulting injuries occurred after Sept. 23, 2007 (e.g., 2007 Interpol notice, 2007 press articles, 2009 site shutdown, 2009 probate damages), so separate accrual restarts the limitations period for those injuries	Arias Group argues Lehman knew or should have known of all RICO injuries by early/mid‑2007 (and many were alleged in Lehman’s Jan. 2007 complaint), so the 2011 RICO suit is untimely	Held: Claims untimely. Most alleged injuries were known pre‑Sept. 2007 and later acts were continuations, not new independent injuries, so separate accrual does not save the complaint
Whether alleged post‑2007 acts constitute new and independent predicate acts that give rise to separate accrual	Lehman isolates later events as discrete RICO predicate acts that inflicted new damage after Sept. 2007	Arias Group contends later events (Interpol notice, articles, website shutdown, probate ruling) were consequences or reaffirmations of earlier denuncias and litigation efforts, not independent acts	Held: Post‑2007 acts were reaffirmations/continuations of the same scheme; not new and independent for separate accrual purposes
Whether Lehman could rely on post‑2007 damages (fees, reputational harm, transfer attempts) to bootstrap untimely earlier acts into a timely claim	Lehman argues some damages (e.g., Interpol Red Notice, website takedown, new transfers in 2011) are distinct injuries giving rise to new claims	Arias Group argues that damages are cumulative and flow from the same earlier acts, so plaintiff cannot bootstrap earlier untimely acts	Held: Bootstrapping rejected; cumulative/continuing damages do not restart limitations

Key Cases Cited

Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (recognizing 4‑year statute of limitations for civil RICO actions)
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (separate accrual rule: new predicate act causing new and independent injury restarts limitation for that injury)
McCaleb v. A.O. Smith Corp., 200 F.3d 747 (Eleventh Circuit on pattern and limitations in RICO context)
Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641 (limitations period begins when injury was or should have been discovered)
Pilkington v. United Airlines, 112 F.3d 1532 (continuing/reaffirmation injuries do not qualify as new and independent acts)
Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Fla., Inc., 906 F.2d 1546 (adoption of separate accrual rule and distinction between initial injury and later independent injuries)
Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506 (acts during bankruptcy/reorganization were part of same scheme and not new independent injuries)
Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 (elements required to prove a RICO claim)