Richard Rocheleau v. Elder Living Construction, 814 F.3d 398

In September 2011 Elder Living ordered a background report on Richard Rocheleau from LexisNexis (predecessor to First Advantage) that returned four criminal convictions.
LexisNexis mailed Rocheleau notice copies of the report on Sept. 16 and Sept. 19 (including FCRA summary of rights) and notified him on Sept. 26 that Lowe’s declined to hire him based in part on the report; Rocheleau received these notices in late September 2011.
Rocheleau contacted LexisNexis repeatedly in September 2011 to complain that the report had been released without his authorization, but he did not dispute the report’s accuracy.
Rocheleau alleges Elder Living obtained the report without permission and that First Advantage and Elder Living failed to provide certain statutory certifications and to follow required procedures under the FCRA.
Rocheleau filed suit on November 25, 2013 (more than two years after he received the September 2011 notices), asserting FCRA violations against Elder Living and First Advantage.
The district court granted summary judgment for both defendants, holding Rocheleau’s claims were time-barred under the FCRA’s two-year discovery-based statute of limitations; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rocheleau’s FCRA claims are time-barred under 15 U.S.C. § 1681p	Rocheleau argued the limitations period was tolled because the §1681s-2(b) dispute process had not been completed	Defendants maintained Rocheleau discovered the alleged violations in September 2011 when he received the notices, triggering the two-year limit	The court held the two-year limitations period began when Rocheleau discovered the facts giving rise to the claim (Sept. 2011); his Nov. 2013 suit was untimely
Whether §1681s-2(b) tolls the statute until the three-step dispute process is complete	Rocheleau relied on precedent holding §1681s-2(b) claims aren’t ripe until the dispute process finishes, so limitations don’t run earlier	Defendants argued §1681s-2(b) applies only to disputes about accuracy/completeness and thus is inapplicable here	The court held §1681s-2(b) does not apply because Rocheleau never disputed accuracy or completeness; the tolling/ripeness rule from Pletz is irrelevant

Hirsch v. CSX Transp., 656 F.3d 359 (6th Cir.) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment framework—whether dispute requires jury)
Mack v. Equable Ascent Fin., L.L.C., 748 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2014) (statute of limitations begins when plaintiff discovers the facts giving rise to the violation, not when plaintiff later recognizes the legal violation)
Hyde v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 861 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.) (limitations for FCRA-type claims commence when report causes injury)