Richard Parsons v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 785 S.E.2d 844

Parsons worked for Halliburton and had an employment agreement requiring arbitration of disputes.
Parsons sued in Kanawha County Circuit Court alleging late payment of final wages under the WPCA and sought class certification.
Halliburton made no answer but, seven months after suit was filed, moved to compel arbitration as its first court filing.
During the seven months Halliburton requested multiple informal extensions to file a responsive pleading and offered to provide information about other employees; plaintiffs counsel agreed to delays but no written stipulation was filed with the court.
The circuit court granted Halliburton’s motion, dismissed the complaint, and compelled arbitration, finding Halliburton had not “actively participated” in the litigation and that the plaintiff failed to prove prejudice.
On appeal the sole issue was whether Halliburton waived its contractual right to arbitrate by its pre-motion conduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Halliburton waived its contractual right to arbitrate by participating in litigation	Parsons: Halliburton’s informal delay requests and offer to produce class-wide information constituted active participation inconsistent with arbitration and implied waiver	Halliburton: Requests for extensions and limited communications did not constitute substantial participation; it promptly moved to compel arbitration as its first formal filing	Court: No waiver. Under state contract law, waiver requires intentional relinquishment of a known right; Halliburton’s limited, informal requests did not show conduct inconsistent with arbitration and it did not actively participate prior to moving to compel
Whether prejudice must be shown to establish waiver of arbitration	Parsons: Relied on authority suggesting prejudice is required for waiver in arbitration context	Halliburton: Contended plaintiff must prove prejudice under some authorities (argued it did not occur)	Court: West Virginia common-law waiver does not require proof of prejudice; it overruled prior precedent to the extent it held prejudice was necessary to establish common-law waiver of contract rights

State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (W.Va. 1995) (standard of appellate review for dismissals)
Hoffman v. Wheeling Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 133 W.Va. 694, 57 S.E.2d 725 (W.Va. 1950) (definition and elements of waiver)
Ara v. Erie Ins. Co., 182 W.Va. 266, 387 S.E.2d 320 (W.Va. 1989) (waiver requires intentional relinquishment of a known right)
Blue v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 106 W.Va. 642, 147 S.E. 22 (W.Va. 1929) (waiver may be inferred from actions)
Potesta v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 202 W.Va. 308, 504 S.E.2d 135 (W.Va. 1998) (distinguishing waiver and estoppel; waiver focuses on obligor’s conduct)
Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W.Va. 646, 724 S.E.2d 250 (W.Va. 2011) (FAA places arbitration clauses on same footing as other contracts)
Geological Assessment & Leasing v. O’Hara, 236 W.Va. 381, 780 S.E.2d 647 (W.Va. 2015) (arbitration rights are contractual; state contract defenses apply)
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (federal policy favoring arbitration via the FAA)
Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (waiver analyzed under totality of circumstances)