Richard Moore v. Brian Stirling, 952 F.3d 174

Background

In 1999 Richard Bernard Moore shot and killed a convenience-store clerk during a robbery; Moore was convicted of murder and related offenses and sentenced to death in 2001; the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal.
Moore pursued state post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging trial counsel were ineffective for (1) failing to adequately challenge physical/crime-scene evidence and (2) failing to develop/present mitigation evidence; the PCR court held an extensive hearing, discredited Moore’s testimony, and denied relief under Strickland.
Moore then filed a federal habeas petition raising the same two ineffective-assistance claims plus a new claim that trial counsel failed to challenge the prosecutor’s discretionary decision to seek death; he presented additional forensic and mitigation evidence in federal proceedings.
Moore argued the new evidence ‘‘fundamentally alters’’ the two PCR claims (so they are unexhausted/defaulted) and that his PCR counsel was ineffective (Martinez) so federal courts must excuse default and review de novo without AEDPA deference.
The district court applied AEDPA deference, concluded the new evidence only strengthened but did not fundamentally alter the physical- and mitigation-claims, and deemed the prosecutorial-discretion claim procedurally defaulted and not substantial under Martinez.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed: the two claims were presented and adjudicated in state court (so AEDPA deference applies), and the new prosecutorial-discretion claim is defaulted and not excused because it lacks a substantial showing of ineffective assistance.

Issues

Issue	Moore's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Physical-evidence ineffective-assistance	New forensic affidavits and notes fundamentally alter the PCR claim; PCR counsel ineffective for not presenting them; default should be excused and claim reviewed de novo	The physical-evidence claim was presented and adjudicated in PCR; new evidence only strengthens the claim, does not change its substance; AEDPA deference applies	New evidence merely bolstered the claim; PCR court adjudicated the claim on the merits; AEDPA deference was proper; denial affirmed
Mitigation-evidence ineffective-assistance	Newly developed witness affidavits and background investigation fundamentally alter mitigation claim; PCR counsel ineffective so default excused and de novo review required	Mitigation claim was presented in PCR; trial counsel reasonably investigated; additional evidence would not create a reasonable probability of a different result	New mitigation evidence did not fundamentally alter the claim; the PCR court reasonably found no prejudice; AEDPA deference appropriate; denial affirmed
Failure to challenge prosecutor’s decision to seek death (prosecutorial-discretion)	Trial counsel were ineffective for not legally contesting prosecutor’s discretionary decision; Martinez excuses procedural default of this claim	Claim was not raised in state court (procedural default) and is not substantial because statutory aggravators and state-court review support death sentence	Claim is procedurally defaulted; Martinez does not excuse default because the underlying ineffective-assistance claim is not substantial; denial affirmed
Applicability of Martinez and AEDPA deference	PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness excuses defaults and requires de novo review for all claims Moore now advances	Martinez only excuses default for substantial ineffective-trial-counsel claims; AEDPA still applies to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court	Martinez not triggered for the two adjudicated claims; it fails for the prosecutorial-discretion claim because that claim lacks merit; AEDPA deference governs the adjudicated claims

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (established the two-part standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (limits federal habeas relief where state courts adjudicate claims on the merits)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (narrow equitable exception permitting Martinez cause to excuse certain PCR defaults)
Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (describing narrowness of Martinez exception and its requirements)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits federal habeas review to the state-court record when § 2254(d) applies)
Gray v. Zook, 806 F.3d 783 (4th Cir.) (new evidence that only strengthens a claim does not fundamentally alter it for exhaustion purposes)
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (clarifies Martinez application where state law channels ineffective-assistance claims to collateral review)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (precludes broad Eighth Amendment challenge given statutory and appellate review supporting sentence)
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (exhaustion requirement and procedural default doctrine)
Wise v. Warden, 839 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir.) (explains when new evidence places a claim in a fundamentally different evidentiary posture)