Richard Litschewski v. Robert Dooley, 792 F.3d 1012

Richard Litschewski was convicted by a jury of three child-sex offenses and received three consecutive sentences totaling 27.5 years.
The state supreme court reversed the sentences because South Dakota law required consecutive sentences to be ordered chronologically by the time each offense was committed, and remanded for resentencing.
On remand the trial court rearranged the order so the earlier-in-time offense was served first, credited time already served on the originally first-ordered sentence toward the new order, and did not increase the aggregate imprisonment term.
Litschewski argued the rearrangement effectively required him to serve the same 7.5-year sentence twice (a double jeopardy multiple-punishment violation) and sought relief in state court and then via 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court.
The federal district court granted habeas relief, vacating one sentence; the State appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo legal issues under AEDPA and reversed, holding that fairminded jurists could conclude the rearrangement did not impose multiple punishments beyond what the legislature authorized.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether rearranging the order of consecutive sentences after one was fully served violates the Double Jeopardy Clause by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense	Litschewski: Rearrangement required him to serve the same sentence again, so it amounted to double punishment	State: Rearrangement only corrected sentencing order under state law, credited time served, did not increase total punishment authorized by statute	Held: No violation; reasonable jurists could conclude the total punishment did not exceed legislative authorization (reversing district court)
Whether AEDPA precludes federal habeas relief absent clearly established Supreme Court precedent forbidding the state-court remedy	Litschewski: Constitutional principles protect finality and bar double punishment even if no direct Supreme Court precedent	State: Without a squarely applicable Supreme Court rule, the state decision is not an unreasonable application of federal law	Held: AEDPA bars relief here because Supreme Court precedent is not sufficiently specific to make the state court decision an unreasonable application

Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873) (double jeopardy prevents twice punishing the same offense)
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (double jeopardy protects the integrity of final judgments)
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (defendant has an expectation of finality in a sentence after appeals and service)
Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (1989) (upholding state court alteration and crediting of time served when total punishment remained authorized)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA review requires showing no reasonable basis for the state court decision)
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010) (deference principles under § 2254(d))