Richard, Larry Wayne, PD-1033-15

Appellant Larry Richard challenged a suppression ruling arising from two parallel cases (No. 1233998 and No. 1401120) following his deferred adjudication on aggravated assault and a separate possession-with-intent-to-deliver charge, with motions to suppress based on a Terry frisk and the search of his shoes at issue.
Police stopped Richard for speeding in a 35 mph zone; he was detained with two passengers and subjected to an initial frisk for weapons.
During a second search, a plastic baggie was seen protruding from Richard's shoe, prompting further searches.
The police claimed the initial stop and subsequent searches were justified by safety concerns and observed furtive movements, but the defense challenged the scope and legality of the searches.
The First Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression denial in an unpublished opinion, prompting Supreme Court review on the proper standard for evaluating Terry frisk and the related plain-view claims.
The Court is asked to clarify applicable standards for Terry searches and determine whether the contraband could be viewed in plain view given the officer’s actions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Terry frisk standard applied	Richard argues the Court of Appeals used the wrong standard by disregarding the officer’s subjective reason for the frisk.	State contends the initial stop and frisk were properly analyzed under Terry; subjective intent is not dispositive.	Yes; court held the appeals court used the wrong standard and that subjective intent matters in Terry frisk analysis.
Legality of second Terry frisk	Richard maintains the second frisk was unjustified and overbroad beyond scope of a protective frisk.	State asserts the second frisk was within permissible scope given safety concerns and narcotics risk.	No; the second frisk exceeded permissible scope and was not supported by articulable facts justifying a weapons search.
Plain-view view of contraband	Richard argues the contraband could not be viewed lawfully in plain view because the officer was not lawfully positioned to view it.	State relies on plain-view doctrine as justification for viewing contraband.	No; the officer was not lawfully positioned to view the baggie, so plain-view applicability failed.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes limits on stop-and-frisk and scope of searches)
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (limits on searches to locate weapons and need for specific facts)
Smallwood v. State, No. 04-11-00749-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10835 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2013) (protection frisk standards for weapon searches)
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (limits on frisk/search for weapons; relevance of reasonableness)
Davis v. State, 829 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (unreasonableness of certain searches lacking justification)
Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (subjectivity of detention vs. search justification)
Michigan v. Lane, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (plain-view and lawful location principles)
Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (plain-view and lawful viewing prerequisites)
Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (plain-view doctrine foundations)
Thomas v. State, 297 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (case on protective search and scope)
Worthy v. State, 805 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (search-and-seizure standards)
Amitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (early Terry/stop-and-frisk standards)
LeBlanc v. State, 138 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (furtive movements and detention considerations)