Richard Krueger, Jr. v. Michael Angelos, 26 F.4th 212

The Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore (STA) and the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) created four employee-benefit trust agreements under the Labor Management Relations Act, each governed by equal numbers of union and management trustees.
The trust agreements define “Employer” as “the STA or an Employer‑Member or former Employer‑Member of the STA.”
Union-appointed trustees moved to amend the agreements to expand “Employer” to include non‑STA employers that sign CBAs requiring contributions; management trustees opposed, producing a tie vote.
Management trustees refused the union trustees’ request to submit the dispute to arbitration; the union trustees sued to compel arbitration under 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B).
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) compels arbitration of a deadlock over amending the trust definition of “Employer”	§186(c)(5)(B) requires an impartial umpire to resolve trustee deadlocks, so the amendment dispute is arbitrable	§186(c)(5)(B) is limited to administration/management of the fund, not to policy or agreement amendments	Held: §186(c)(5)(B) does not cover amendments to trust agreements; arbitration under §186(c)(5)(B) is limited to fund administration
Whether the trusts’ arbitration clause requires arbitration of an amendment to the definition of “Employer”	The arbitration clause for tie votes permits an arbitrator to resolve the dispute; arbitrator can ‘stand in the shoes’ of trustees and implement change	Section 8.03 expressly bars an arbitrator from changing "basic provisions;" the definition of “Employer” is a basic provision, so parties did not agree to arbitrate such amendments	Held: Contract bars arbitration here—definition of “Employer” is a basic provision and Section 8.03 provides the required "positive assurance" that such disputes are not arbitrable

Gillick v. Elliott, 1 F.4th 608 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding that amending a trust agreement is not part of day‑to‑day administration under §186(c)(5)(B))
Ader v. Hughes, 570 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1978) (concluding trust‑agreement amendment decisions are not trust “administration” under §302/§186 framework)
Emp. Trustees of W. Pa. Teamsters v. Union Trustees of W. Pa. Teamsters, 870 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2017) (arbitrable deadlock involved clarification that would not amend the trust; implied that amendments are non‑administrative)
Barrett v. Miller, 276 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1960) (arbitrator’s powers cannot exceed trustees’ powers; if trustees cannot do something, arbitrator cannot either)
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (arbitration is contractual; presumption of arbitrability and requirement of “positive assurance” to exclude disputes)
United Steel v. Continental Tire N. Am., 568 F.3d 158 (4th Cir. 2009) (arbitration under §185 for contract disputes—distinguished as inapplicable to §186 analysis)
Farmer v. Fisher, 586 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1978) (describing administration as management tasks rather than agreement amendments)