RICHARD JOHNSON V. CHARLES RYAN
55 F.4th 1167
9th Cir.2022Background
- Richard Johnson, an Arizona prisoner, was validated in 2014 as a member of a Security Threat Group (Warrior Society) and placed in ADC maximum custody (very restrictive conditions resembling solitary).
- ADC policy (DO 806) places validated, non-debriefed STG members in maximum custody, with annual reviews that, for STG inmates, principally consider validation status and whether the inmate has renounced/debriefed.
- ADC offers two off-ramps: (1) renunciation + debriefing (informant-style disclosure) and (2) a multi‑phase Step‑Down Program (SDP) leading to close custody; removal from SDP can result in return to maximum custody and reeligibility restrictions.
- Johnson entered SDP, reached Phase IV (transfer to close custody), then was removed in April 2018 after SSU found allegedly STG‑related items; he was returned to maximum custody without being told the factual basis in usable detail.
- Procedural history: district court dismissed Johnson’s challenge to ADC’s annual-review process (28 U.S.C. §1915A) and later granted summary judgment to defendants on his SDP‑removal due process and First Amendment retaliation claims; Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of ADC annual reviews of STG validation under Due Process | Johnson: annual reviews are insufficient because they consider only validation and debriefing, not current conduct, criminal history, or disciplinary record, risking erroneous long‑term confinement | ADC: annual review plus the ability to renounce/debrief suffices; deference to prison officials is required given gang‑security interests | Court: affirmed dismissal — plaintiff has liberty interest in avoiding maximum custody, but ADC’s annual review + debrief option and deference to its determination that validated STG status indicates ongoing risk satisfy Mathews balancing at pleading stage |
| Due process for removal from SDP and return from close custody to maximum custody | Johnson: removal from Phase IV deprived him of liberty because it produced an atypical and significant hardship; he received inadequate notice/hearing to contest factual basis | ADC: SDP is voluntary, no independent liberty interest in participation; annual review/debrief options protect liberty | Court: reversed summary judgment — no independent liberty right in SDP participation, but there is a protected liberty interest in avoiding return from close custody to maximum custody; procedures given here were inadequate (lack of meaningful notice of factual basis), so triable due process claim remains |
| First Amendment retaliation for removing Johnson from SDP | Johnson: removal and return to maximum custody retaliatory for his litigation (protected conduct); evidence includes statements and timing | ADC: action advanced penological purpose (curtailing gang activity) and was supported by SSU evidence | Court: reversed summary judgment — viewing evidence in plaintiff’s favor, genuine dispute exists whether defendants acted with retaliatory motive and whether removal reasonably advanced legitimate penological goals |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (framework for balancing private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, and governmental interest in procedural‑due‑process analysis)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (recognizing liberty interest where conditions of confinement are atypical and significant; deference to prison security judgments)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (liberty‑interest inquiry focuses on the nature of the conditions; atypical and significant hardship test)
- Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (administrative segregation requires periodic review; prison officials’ security judgments warrant deference)
- Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986) (retention‑review frequency for segregation and procedural protections in prison segregation cases)
- Brown v. Oregon Dep’t of Corrections, 751 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2014) (conditions of intensive segregation can create a liberty interest)
- Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) ("some evidence" standard in prison disciplinary contexts)
- Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussion of gang threat and debriefing as a route out of restrictive housing)