955 N.W.2d 822
Iowa2021Background
- On Jan. 28, 2013, in heavy fog and freezing rain, a CCP freight train (≈47 mph; within 60 mph federal limit) struck a county road grader at a passive crossing; the grader became visible to the train about 6 seconds before impact and entered the crossing ≈3 seconds before impact.
- Plaintiff Richard Wermerskirchen suffered serious injuries and sued for negligence: excessive speed, failure to keep a proper lookout, failure to brake, and inadequate audible warning (horn).
- Locomotive event recorder and crew testimony showed bells and horn were sounding; district court denied summary judgment on horn claims but granted summary judgment to defendants on excessive-speed (FRSA preemption) and on lookout/braking (no causation).
- A jury returned verdicts for defendants on the horn claims; the court of appeals affirmed the horn verdict but reversed the summary judgment on speed/lookout/braking and ordered a new trial on those claims.
- The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review and reinstated the district court: it held the excessive-speed claim preempted by the FRSA (weather/fog is not an "essentially local" or "specific, individual" hazard) and affirmed summary judgment on lookout/braking for lack of causation (even immediate braking would not have avoided collision).
- Justice Appel concurred/dissented: agreed lookout/braking properly dismissed on causation, but would have held that an excessive-speed claim based on dense fog is not preempted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FRSA preempts plaintiff's state-law excessive-speed claim given compliance with federal speed limit and dense fog | Fog created a specific/individual local hazard; state negligence for traveling too fast for conditions is permitted | FRSA (49 U.S.C. §20106) and Track Safety Standards preempt state excessive-speed claims when train complied with federal speed limits | Majority: Preempted — weather/fog is not a “specific, individual” or “essentially local” hazard under Easterwood and FRSA; excessive-speed claim barred |
| Whether lookout/braking claims are preempted or, alternatively, fail for lack of causation | Once grader could have been seen, crew should have reacted/slowed; jury must decide | Either preempted as related to speed or (alternatively) undisputed evidence shows even immediate braking/lookout would not have prevented crash | Not preempted as to a specific hazard once visible, but summary judgment affirmed on causation: undisputed expert evidence shows braking/lookout would not have avoided collision |
| Adequacy/timing of horn and related trial rulings | Horn was not sounded properly or sufficiently in advance | Horn and bell were activated per regulations; recorder corroborates crew | Jury found for defendants on horn claims; court of appeals and Supreme Court left that verdict intact |
| Proper scope/meaning of Easterwood’s footnote re: "specific, individual hazard" | Footnote 15 permits state claims to require slowing/stopping for specific hazards; weather can qualify | Easterwood and subsequent cases limit the exception narrowly; routine weather is not essentially local | Court adopts a narrow reading: exception allows claims tied to an imminent, identifiable hazard (e.g., vehicle on tracks), but ordinary weather/fog is not such an exception |
Key Cases Cited
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993) (establishes FRSA preemption of state excessive-speed claims; footnote 15 contemplates a narrow exception for duties to slow/stop for a specific, individual hazard)
- Seyler v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Kan. 2000) (holds adverse weather/flash flooding not a specific, individual hazard; excessive-speed claims preempted)
- Grade v. BNSF Ry., 676 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2012) (Eighth Circuit: fog/ice are not uniquely local; inadequacy-of-warning and weather-based speed claims preempted)
- Partenfelder v. Rohde, 850 N.W.2d 896 (Wis. 2014) (Wisconsin Supreme Court defines "specific, individual hazard" narrowly and allows claims concerning crew response once a specific hazard is perceived)
- Bakhuyzen v. Nat'l Rail Passenger Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (contrary view: weather may constitute a specific, individual hazard and thus avoid preemption)
- Cox v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 998 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (holds snow/visibility limits are not specific, individual hazards; warns against opening floodgates to weather-based state tort suits)