305 P.3d 536
Idaho2013Background
- Greystone applied in 2005 to develop a subdivision/PUD in McCall. After its application, McCall adopted Ordinances 819 (exaction of housing units) and 820 (housing fee).
- Greystone’s subdivision was exempt from Ord. 819 (application pre‑dated it), but Ord. 820 applied because no building permit had been issued yet. Greystone nonetheless conveyed nine lots to McCall (valued ~$1.12M) and signed a Development Agreement in May 2006; the lots were conveyed July 31, 2006.
- The Development Agreement required Greystone to construct roads/utilities and other site improvements; Greystone later performed those improvements and conveyed housing to low‑income residents.
- A district court later invalidated Ordinances 819 and 820 as taxes; McCall repealed them (2008) and adopted refund resolutions. Greystone sought a refund in 2009; McCall denied it.
- Greystone sued in 2010 asserting inverse condemnation under the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions seeking reimbursement for (a) value of the nine lots and (b) costs of improvements. The district court granted McCall summary judgment; Greystone appealed and McCall cross‑appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Greystone's Argument | McCall's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether costs to construct improvements are a separate takings claim from the lot conveyance | Improvements claim is distinct; accrued later; separate damages | Improvement costs arose from same agreement and thus are part of lot‑value damages | Costs were part of the lot‑value claim; not a separate claim (affirmed) |
| Whether Greystone gave timely notice for its Idaho takings claim under ITCA (I.C. §6‑906) | Resolution 08‑11 and later refund request constituted timely notice / created a new claim | Greystone’s claim accrued in 2006; it failed to give notice within 180 days; refund resolution did not create a new takings cause | State takings claim barred for failure to timely present notice under ITCA (affirmed) |
| Ripeness of federal takings claim (Williamson County finality & exhaustion) | The conveyance was a physical taking so Williamson County finality satisfied; federal claim ripe | Ordinance didn’t apply to Greystone; conveyance was voluntary and nonfinal; Greystone failed to seek state just‑compensation remedies under I.C. §67‑8003 | Claim not ripe: no final administrative decision and Greystone failed to exhaust state statutory remedy; federal claim dismissed (affirmed) |
| Entitlement to attorney fees | N/A (Greystone opposed) | McCall sought fees under I.C. §§12‑117, 12‑121 | District court did not abuse discretion denying fees below; no fees on appeal because neither side wholly prevailed (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (ripeness test for regulatory takings)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (finality requirement; administrative avenues may render a taking claim nonfinal)
- Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375 (physical exaction satisfies Williamson County finality)
- BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168 (knowledge of facts triggering statute/notice accrual)
- Buckskin Props., Inc. v. Valley County, 154 Idaho 486 (use of I.C. §67‑8003 regulatory‑taking procedure under Idaho law)
- Harbours Pointe of Nashotah, LLC v. Village of Nashotah, 278 F.3d 701 (failure to exhaust state remedies forfeits federal takings claim)
- Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87 (same principle regarding exhaustion)