Richard Glunk v. R. Noone, 689 F. App'x 137

In Dec. 2010 the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine suspended Dr. Richard P. Glunk’s medical license for 60 days for immoral conduct; the Commonwealth Court affirmed.
Glunk I: In Apr. 2014 Glunk sued state officials in Middle District PA alleging due process violations, including that an ex parte letter and enclosed confidential peer‑review materials improperly influenced the hearing examiner.
Glunk II: Glunk later filed a separate suit in Eastern District PA adding private defendants (Main Line Health) and repeating allegations about the ex parte letter and peer‑review materials.
The Eastern District dismissed the private parties and then transferred Glunk II to the Middle District under the first‑filed rule because it substantially overlapped Glunk I.
After transfer, the Middle District dismissed Glunk I for failure to state a claim and then dismissed Glunk II as barred by res judicata (claim preclusion) because it involved the same parties/privity and essentially the same cause of action.
Glunk appealed, arguing Glunk II asserted a new claim based on October 2014 revelations about peer‑review materials and that the court abused its discretion by staying discovery.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Glunk II asserts a distinct cause of action or is barred by claim preclusion	Glunk argued Glunk II raised a new, distinct claim discovered in Oct. 2014 about confidential peer‑review materials that were not and could not have been litigated in Glunk I	Defendants argued Glunk II repeats the same factual and legal theory already raised in Glunk I and thus is precluded	Court held Glunk II is barred by res judicata because the prior final judgment involved the same parties/privity and essentially the same cause of action
Whether the district court abused its discretion by staying discovery while motions to dismiss were pending	Glunk argued the stay prevented him from obtaining email communications that would show viability of his claims	Defendants argued discovery was unnecessary because the pleaded facts cannot support due process relief and managing docket efficiency justified the stay	Court held no abuse of discretion: the stay was a permissible docket‑management decision and additional discovery would not have produced elements needed for relief

Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2012) (standard of plenary review for dismissal)
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 2001) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of discovery stays; stays can be proper during motions to dismiss)
In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (elements and application of claim preclusion)
Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1991) (test for whether different claims arise from same cause of action: essential similarity of underlying events)
EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988) (first‑filed rule principles)
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se pleadings are liberally construed)