Richard F. Burkhart v. Genworth Financial, Inc.
275 A.3d 1259
Del. Ch.2022Background
- Genworth Financial is the corporate parent of Genworth Life Insurance Company (GLIC), which issued long-term care (LTC) policies; plaintiffs are GLIC LTC policyholders and agents (putative class).
- Plaintiffs allege Genworth and affiliates siphoned capital from GLIC (dividends, termination of reinsurance support) as GLIC’s LTC line became unprofitable, impairing GLIC’s ability to pay future claims and commissions.
- In an earlier opinion (Burkhart I), the Court held plaintiffs had DUFTA standing as contingent creditors of GLIC for certain claims (but dismissed some dividend claims as time‑barred).
- After that decision, GFIH sold valuable Canadian/Australian mortgage‑insurance subsidiaries and distributed proceeds up the corporate chain; plaintiffs amended to add Counts V–VII attacking those distributions as fraudulent transfers.
- Defendants moved to dismiss Counts V–VII, arguing (1) plaintiffs are not “creditors” of GFIH because they lack an independent “right to payment,” and (2) the amended claims seek only unwinding/restoration (not a right to payment) so they do not qualify as DUFTA “claims.”
- The Court granted the partial motion: Counts V–VII were dismissed because plaintiffs failed to plead a “right to payment” (i.e., creditor status) as required by DUFTA; the Court did not adopt a categorical rule that DUFTA claims can never create creditor status but held these amended counts fail as pleaded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a DUFTA claim alone can create “creditor” status to bring a later DUFTA claim against a transferee | A DUFTA claim can make a plaintiff a creditor “by dint” of the statute (UVTA commentary supports narrow circumstances where a DUFTA claim creates creditor status) | DUFTA is remedial; a plaintiff needs an independent right to payment separate from DUFTA to be a “creditor” | Court refused to adopt a categorical prohibition and recognized competing authority, but did not need to definitively resolve the broad question here |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded a “claim” (a right to payment) against GFIH so they are “creditors” under DUFTA for Counts V–VII | Counts III–IV make plaintiffs contingent creditors of GFIH and Counts V–VII seek restoration of value—sufficient to establish a DUFTA “claim” | Counts V–VII seek only equitable unwinding/restoration (no monetary right to payment), so plaintiffs lack a DUFTA “claim” and creditor status | Held for Defendants: plaintiffs did not plead a right to payment from GFIH; Counts V–VII fail as a matter of law and are dismissed |
| Whether DUFTA liability can reach transfers of non‑debtor property (i.e., GFIH’s own assets sold and distributed) | DUFTA permits recovery of proceeds and “other property of the transferee”; subsequent transfers can be independently voidable | Fraudulent‑transfer liability does not attach to transfers by non‑debtors of property that was never debtor’s; exposing non‑debtor transfers would create unbounded liability across affiliates | Court emphasized settled principle that DUFTA does not reach transfers of non‑debtor property; this undercuts plaintiffs’ theory that GFIH’s asset sales are actionable under DUFTA |
| Whether Count VII (equitable relief under §1307) survives despite briefing/merits issues | Count VII invokes broad equitable powers and should survive if equitable relief is appropriate; defendants waived challenge | Defendants argued Count VII is addressed by same legal defects as Counts V–VI and was not waived | Court rejected waiver argument, held Count VII suffers the same fatal defect and dismissed it, but noted §1307 allows flexible remedies for any surviving DUFTA claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Burkhart v. Genworth Fin., Inc., 250 A.3d 842 (Del. Ch. 2020) (earlier ruling that plaintiffs had DUFTA standing as contingent creditors for certain claims)
- Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., 879 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 2018) (DUFTA liability does not attach to transfers by non‑debtors)
- Alliant Tax Credit 31, Inc. v. Murphy, 924 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 2019) (fraudulent‑transfer actions are remedial and predicated on independent underlying claims)
- Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill, 981 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 2013) (UFTA depends on an independently valid claim; remedies are not claim‑creating)
- Deford v. Soo Line R. Co., 867 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir. 1989) (UFTA is remedial and supplies alternate remedies for preexisting creditor rights)
- Wiand v. Lee, 753 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2014) (receiver could recover as creditor where monetary judgment was appropriate)
- Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d 1037 (R.I. 1997) (an underlying fraudulent‑transfer claim reduced to money judgment may evidence a right to payment for a subsequent claim)
