Richard Dodd v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
71A03-1706-CR-1211
| Ind. Ct. App. | Sep 27, 2017Background
- In 1998 Richard Dodd was convicted of attempted murder and burglary and initially received consecutive sentences of 50 and 8 years; post-conviction proceedings led to resentencing to 50 years (attempted murder) plus a consecutive 5-year term (burglary).
- In 2016 Dodd filed a motion to modify his sentence under Indiana’s sentence-modification statute; the State objected.
- The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the prosecuting attorney’s consent was required for the filing.
- Dodd appealed, arguing the court erred in concluding the State’s consent was required.
- The statutory question turned on whether the 2014–2015 amendments to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17 apply to Dodd and whether he is a “violent criminal” (which would preserve the consent requirement).
- The Court of Appeals held the current statute applies to pre-2014 sentences, Dodd is a “violent criminal” because of his attempted murder conviction, and therefore prosecutorial consent was required.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecuting attorney consent was required for Dodd’s motion to modify sentence filed more than 365 days after sentencing | State: consent required for violent criminals under current statute | Dodd: he should not be a "violent criminal" for § 35-38-1-17 because attempted murder was not classified as a crime of violence under a separate statute at his sentencing | Court: current § 35-38-1-17 controls; it defines "violent criminal" to include attempted murder, so prosecutor consent was required |
| Whether the post-2014 amendments to the modification statute apply retroactively to crimes/sentences before July 1, 2014 | State: amendments apply per statutory language and later clarifying amendment | Dodd: seeks benefits of amendment but argues its violent-criminal definition should not apply to him | Court: 2015 clarification makes the amended statute controlling for pre-2014 cases, including Dodd |
| Whether Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 affects the sentence-modification consent requirement | State: irrelevant to modification statute | Dodd: attempted murder was not a crime of violence under § 35-50-1-2 at sentencing, so he should not be treated as violent for modification | Court: § 35-50-1-2 governs consecutive-sentence limits, not modification; it is irrelevant |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to modify | Dodd: court misapplied law by requiring consent | Court/State: no abuse; court correctly interpreted statute | Court: no abuse of discretion; denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (standard of review for sentence-modification rulings and abuse-of-discretion framework)
- Woodford v. State, 58 N.E.3d 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (treating the amended modification statute as applicable to pre-July 1, 2014 convictions)