Richard Crayton v. United States
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10771
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Richard Crayton was convicted by a jury of distributing heroin; the jury did not unanimously find that the heroin caused Nicole Hedges’ death.
- The district judge made a judicial finding (by a preponderance) that Hedges died from Crayton’s heroin and, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), imposed a mandatory 20-year minimum.
- Crayton’s direct appeal was affirmed; his conviction became final after Harris v. United States but before Alleyne v. United States.
- Alleyne (2013) overruled Harris and held that any fact that increases mandatory minimums is an element of the offense and must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Crayton filed a § 2255 petition arguing Alleyne should apply retroactively on collateral review; the district court held Alleyne is not retroactive.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed: it concluded Alleyne does not apply retroactively to initial collateral petitions like Crayton’s (following circuit and other courts of appeals decisions).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Crayton) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alleyne applies retroactively on collateral review | Alleyne announces a watershed rule (beyond a reasonable doubt for elements) and should apply retroactively under Teague | Alleyne is a new procedural rule that is not "watershed"; prior practice of judge-found sentencing facts by preponderance remains lawful | Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review; affirmed |
| Whether Alleyne entitles Crayton to relief because the judge relied on judicial factfinding | Crayton: the judge’s reliance on pre-Alleyne law caused a harsher sentence and Alleyne should correct that | Gov: retroactivity is a categorical Teague question — individualized unfairness doesn’t change retroactivity | Crayton’s individualized circumstances do not make Alleyne retroactive for him; denied |
| Whether facts increasing mandatory minimums constitute elements of an offense | Alleyne: such facts are elements and must be proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt | Pre-Alleyne: such facts could be sentencing findings by judge (Harris) under preponderance | Alleyne treats those facts as elements, but that change is not retroactive under Teague |
| Whether Apprendi/Alleyne are so fundamental (Teague watershed) to require retroactivity | Crayton (and concurrence): Alleyne enforces Winship’s beyond-a-reasonable-doubt core, thus is watershed | Majority: longstanding practice allowed judge findings by preponderance; Alleyne is important but not a watershed rule requiring retroactivity | Court: does not treat Alleyne as a Teague watershed rule; not retroactive |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing maximum sentence must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt)
- Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (judge may find facts increasing mandatory minimums by preponderance — later overruled by Alleyne)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts that increase mandatory minimums are elements that must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (Ring not retroactive on collateral review)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity on collateral review; watershed exception described)
- Winship, In re, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Due Process requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute crime)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel as an example of a fundamental rule invoked in retroactivity discussions)
- United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (judicial factfinding may be used for sentencing consequences in certain contexts)
- Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2002) (Seventh Circuit held Apprendi is not retroactive under Teague)