Richard Clark v. River Metals Recycling, LLC
929 F.3d 434
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- Plaintiff Richard Clark, a maintenance worker, injured his elbow after slipping from a mobile RB6000 Logger/Baler (the "Crusher") used by his employer, alleging hydraulic fluid on a front platform about five feet above ground.
- Clark sued the manufacturer Sierra International Machinery, LLC and lessor River Metals Recycling, LLC in Illinois state court for defective design (insufficient platform/handrails/ladder); defendants removed to federal court on diversity grounds.
- Clark proffered mechanical-engineering expert Dr. James Blundell, who opined the Crusher should have had a ladder, toeboards, and guardrails and cited an ANSI standard; his report was brief and offered no developed alternative design drawings or cost/feasibility analysis.
- The district court excluded Dr. Blundell’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (Daubert framework) as conclusory, methodologically thin, and inaccurate in its characterization of the ANSI standard; it also rejected reliance on a defendant employee’s testimony as an adequate substitute.
- With no admissible expert on design defect, the district court granted summary judgment for both defendants; it also denied leave to amend to add a failure-to-warn claim (Clark did not appeal that denial).
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding expert testimony was required under Illinois’s risk-utility framework and the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Blundell or in deciding no hearing was necessary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by excluding plaintiff's expert under Rule 702 | Blundell’s qualifications and concise report were sufficient; no hearing required and missing manufacturer drawings excused lack of detail | Expert was conclusory, misread ANSI, lacked machine-specific knowledge and alternative-design analysis | Exclusion affirmed — court reasonably found methodology unreliable and conclusions unsupported |
| Whether a hearing was required before excluding the expert | Court should have held a Daubert hearing to probe Blundell’s methodology | Hearing not required; district court can resolve admissibility on submitted materials | No error — district court did not abuse discretion by ruling without a hearing |
| Whether expert testimony was necessary or common sense sufficed under Illinois product-liability law | Design defect (lack of ladder/rail) was obvious to lay jurors; expert not required | Design-defect inquiry implicates risk-utility factors (feasibility, cost, alternatives) that require specialized proof | Expert testimony required under Illinois risk-utility/ integrated test; summary judgment affirmed for lack of admissible expert evidence |
| River Metals’ alternative defenses (e.g., non-manufacturer under 735 ILCS 5/2-621) | N/A on appeal (River Metals sought affirmance on any ground) | River Metals argued procedural statutory defenses and lessor non-liability | Court declined to decide statutory/timing defenses because judgment affirmed on merits; noted cross-appeal not necessary |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (sets federal admissibility framework for expert testimony)
- Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247 (2007) (Illinois endorses risk-utility integrated test for design defects)
- Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516 (2008) (elements and burden in Illinois products-liability design-defect claims)
- McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 1998) (expert testimony must do more than state bare conclusions)
- Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc., 689 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for district court’s Daubert/Rule 702 rulings)
- Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2011) (expert testimony often necessary when issues are outside lay knowledge)
- Baltus v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill. App. 3d 821 (1990) (some product cases may be resolvable by jurors’ common experience)
