RICHARD C. BARTEL v. BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION
128 A.3d 1043
| D.C. | 2015Background
- In 1994 Bartel purchased a $30,761 cashier’s check payable to “Dana McKinley or Edna McKinley or Richard Bartel” and placed it in the McKinleys’ fireproof safe for safekeeping pending a contemplated business deal.
- The deal never closed; Bartel repeatedly demanded return but could not obtain the check; Dana and Edna later became incapacitated and died (Edna 2008, Dana 2011).
- When the safe was later opened the check was not found; estate inventories and available bank records showed no deposit or payment of the check and Maryland unclaimed-property records had no record.
- Bartel submitted a statutory declaration of loss (July 29, 2013) and sued Bank of America seeking payment under D.C. Code §§ 28:3-309 and 28:3-312; the bank refused and moved for summary judgment.
- Superior Court granted summary judgment for the bank, concluding Bartel failed to adduce admissible evidence that the check had not already been paid; the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding Bartel did not bear the burden of proving prior payment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bartel) | Defendant's Argument (Bank) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who bears burden of proving prior payment of a lost cashier’s check? | Bartel argued he need not prove the check was never paid; bank must prove any affirmative defense including prior payment. | Bank argued claimant must show check was not paid (trial court held this). | Majority: Bank bears burden of proving prior payment/defense; Bartel need not prove non-payment. |
| Sufficiency of Bartel’s § 3-312 declaration of loss | Bartel contended his declaration satisfied statutory requirements (and could be read with interrogatory answers). | Bank contended the declaration omitted required averments (e.g., that declarer lost possession and that loss was not from transfer). | Majority: Declination of payment cannot rest on missing burden-of-proof; adequacy of declaration left to trial court on remand. (Dissent would find declaration deficient.) |
| Whether Bartel’s transfer to McKinleys defeats § 3-309 claim | Bartel said delivery was for safekeeping and contingent, so not a transfer that vests enforcement rights in McKinleys. | Bank (and dissent) argued delivery was a transfer (remitter gave payees possession and thus right to enforce), defeating § 3-309(a)(2). | Majority: Fact question exists about whether delivery was a transfer and when possession was lost; leave for trial court. Dissent: transfer shown as matter of law. |
| Whether Bartel was entitled to enforce at time possession was lost (endorsement/negotiation issue) | Bartel relied on circumstantial evidence (no bank deposit, estate inventories, searches) to raise an inference McKinleys did not negotiate the check. | Bank argued McKinleys or others likely endorsed/negotiated the check long ago and bank records no longer exist. | Majority: Material factual dispute exists; plaintiff need not prove non-payment at summary judgment. Dissent: plaintiff failed to adduce competent evidence of entitlement to enforce; summary judgment appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Boyrie v. E & G Prop. Servs., 58 A.3d 475 (D.C. 2013) (summary judgment standard and de novo review)
- Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229 (D.C. 1990) (allocating burden where bank has greater access to relevant facts)
- Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770 (U.S. 2010) (presumption that parties act lawfully)
- Household Fin. Co. v. Watson, 522 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (payment is an affirmative defense)
- Ruby v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 158, 79 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. 1956) (circumstantial evidence can support inference of loss rather than theft)