949 F.3d 14
D.C. Cir.2020Background:
- 215 individual Members of Congress (29 Senators and 186 Representatives) sued President Trump in his official capacity, alleging violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause based on the President’s private business dealings with foreign governments.
- Plaintiffs alleged the President accepted (or would accept) prohibited emoluments without obtaining “the Consent of the Congress,” depriving them of their institutional right to vote on consent.
- They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the President from accepting foreign emoluments absent congressional consent.
- The district court denied the President’s motion to dismiss, finding the Members had Article III standing and an implied equitable cause of action, and that they had stated a claim under the Clause.
- The President appealed interlocutorily; the D.C. Circuit reviewed the standing question de novo and applied Supreme Court precedent governing legislators’ standing.
- The D.C. Circuit held the individual Members lack Article III standing because their alleged injury is an institutional one that must be asserted by the institution (or a majority capable of acting), reversed the standing ruling, remanded with instructions to dismiss, and vacated the district court’s merits rulings as moot.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (Article III) — can individual Members sue for alleged deprivation of their voting/consent power under the Foreign Emoluments Clause? | Blumenthal: individual Members were deprived of their right to vote/consent when the President accepted foreign emoluments without Congress’s consent, causing a concrete institutional injury. | Trump: Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because the asserted injury is institutional (affecting Congress), not an individualized, concrete injury that these Members can assert. | Held: No standing. Under Raines and Bethune‑Hill, individual members cannot assert institutional injuries; only the institution (or a majority able to act) may. |
| Whether the alleged injury is judicially cognizable rather than a political question | Blumenthal: Clause imposes a judicially enforceable procedural requirement (prior congressional consent) and courts can remedy violations. | Trump: The dispute is political/constitutional between branches and not for federal courts when brought by individual legislators. | Held: Court emphasized rigorous standing review for interbranch disputes and concluded nonjusticiability via lack of Article III standing; merits not reached. |
| Existence of an implied equitable cause of action to enjoin the President | Blumenthal: An implied equitable cause of action exists to obtain injunctive relief under the Clause. | Trump: No express or implied cause of action authorizes this suit. | Held: Not reached on the merits; district court’s finding of a cause of action vacated as moot. |
| Request for official‑capacity injunction against the President (separation‑of‑powers concerns) | Blumenthal: An injunction against future acceptance of emoluments is an appropriate remedy to vindicate congressional consent rights. | Trump: An injunction against the President in official capacity raises separation‑of‑powers and constitutional problems. | Held: Not decided; remedy question was mooted by the standing ruling and vacated. |
Key Cases Cited
- Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (individual legislators lack standing to assert institutional injuries unless their votes were nullified and they could have acted to defeat or enact an action)
- Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune‑Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) (individual members cannot assert institutional interests of legislature)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III standing requires a concrete injury in fact)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (three‑part Article III standing test)
- Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (separation‑of‑powers concerns in suits between Congress and the President or other branches)
- United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (limitations on judicially cognizable injuries for institutional grievances)
- United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) (power of legislative bodies vests in aggregate of members)
- Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (narrow exception recognizing legislative‑member standing where votes were nullified on a constitutional amendment)
- Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (individual House members lacked standing to challenge executive order)
- Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (congressmen lacked standing to seek declaratory judgment about President’s conduct of military action)