Richard Amos v. Loretta Lynch
790 F.3d 512
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- Amos, a Philippine national, is a lawful permanent resident who entered the U.S. in 1980 at about age nine.
- In 1990, Amos was convicted in Maryland of “causing abuse to a child” under former Md Art 27 § 35A (1988).
- The Maryland statute includes sexual abuse of a child and also covers omissions to act in certain circumstances.
- DHS issued a notice to appear in 2008 seeking removal as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) for “sexual abuse of a minor” based on that conviction.
- The BIA concluded the Maryland offense qualifies under Subsection A using a modified categorical approach, focusing on the underlying conduct including sexual acts by Amos.
- Amos challenges the BIA’s determination as legally erroneous; the Fourth Circuit reviews de novo and vacates the removal order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Maryland conviction fits the generic federal offense | Amos argues the least culpable conduct is not within sexual abuse of a minor | BIA contends the Maryland act falls within the broad federal offense | BIA erred; conviction does not categorically match Subsection A |
| Role of Rodriguez-Rodriguez in Amos’ review | Rodriguez-Rodriguez does not define the generic offense for this case | BIA relied on Rodriguez-Rodriguez as guidance | Rodriguez-Rodriguez does not establish a controlling definition for the generic offense here |
| Application of Taylor/Moncrieffe categorical approach | Need a defined generic offense to compare elements | BIA’s undefined framework allows broader interpretation | Without a defined generic offense, the BIA cannot determine a match; court vacates |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defines the categorical approach for ag felonies)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (categorical match requires state offense to necessarily resemble the generic offense)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (requires uniform, categorical application of the definition)
- Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (1999) (BIA decision on breadth of ‘sexual abuse’ and use of § 3509(a)(8) as a guide)
- Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (2008) (discusses Chevron deference and definition of the generic offense ( Ninth Cir ))
- Castillo v. Holder, 776 F.3d 262 (2015) (defines deference to BIA definitions and analyzes ‘theft offense’)
- Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276 (2005) (discusses deferential treatment of BIA interpretations of generic crimes)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (defines when to apply modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
- Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347 (2013) (discusses applicability of the modified categorical approach)