Richard A. Rodriguez v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
04-14-00342-CV
| Tex. App. | Feb 2, 2015Background
- In 1995 Rodriguez executed a note (original principal $147,100) secured by a deed of trust; assignments later transferred the deed and JPMC is successor in interest and held the original note at trial.
- Rodriguez defaulted and stopped payments in early 2000; servicer sent default/acceleration notices in May–August 2000 and foreclosure was scheduled but did not occur because Rodriguez filed suit on September 5, 2000.
- JPMC (as successor) filed a counterclaim for breach and (later) judicial foreclosure: original counterclaim filed August 11, 2004; first amended counterclaim (expressly seeking foreclosure) filed April 20, 2012.
- Pretrial, the trial court (on agreed briefing under Rule 248) ruled JPMC’s foreclosure claim was not time-barred, applying acceleration and tolling from prior courtroom actions that prevented foreclosure for 156 days.
- Two-day jury trial found Rodriguez breached and awarded JPMC $441,027.10 plus fees, costs, interest and judicial foreclosure; Rodriguez’s post-trial motions were denied and he appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rodriguez) | Defendant's Argument (JPMC) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether JPMC’s judicial-foreclosure claim is barred by limitations | Acceleration occurred earlier (March/April/May 2000) so foreclosure claim is time-barred | Acceleration was first effective July 7 or Aug 11, 2000; original counterclaim (Aug 11, 2004) was within four years and tolling for court actions makes it timely; amended pleading relates back | Trial court correctly held foreclosure claim not barred by limitations |
| Whether amended counterclaim seeking foreclosure relates back to original counterclaim | First Amended Counterclaim was a new claim that should be time-barred | Section 16.068 permits relation back where original pleading was timely and amendment arises from same transaction | First Amended Counterclaim related back and was timely |
| Admissibility of updated payoff quote (Ex. 24) produced shortly before trial | Late disclosure prejudiced Rodriguez and should be excluded | Rule 193.6 permits admission if good cause or no unfair surprise/prejudice; payoff merely updated accrued amounts and prior filings showed similar figures | Trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting Exhibit 24 (no unfair surprise/prejudice) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for damages (interest calculation) | Interest calculation not shown with sufficient detail; award unsupported | Principal was admitted by Rodriguez, Note specifies interest rate, payoff quote and witness testimony explained calculation | Evidence was legally sufficient; more than a scintilla supported the jury’s damage award |
| Admissibility of attorney-fee testimony after substitution of counsel/expert designation shortly before trial | Late designation of current counsel as fee experts was prejudicial and should have been excluded | Prior counsel had always been designated; substitution merely named current trial counsel to testify; JPMC sought fees from outset | Trial court properly admitted fee testimony (no unfair surprise/prejudice) |
| Motion to recuse judges based on letter about docket delay | Letter and expedited docket management created reasonable doubt about impartiality | Letter from a neighbor did not create bias; docket management and enforcement of schedule do not demonstrate partiality | Denial of recusal was not an abuse of discretion |
| Challenge to summary judgment re: standing / quiet title | (Vaguely briefed) contention that standing or chain of assignments invalidated summary judgment | JPMC produced original note and uncontroverted chain of assignments showing successor status and possession of note | Appellant’s briefing inadequate to preserve the issue; summary judgment supported by possession of the original note and assignments |
Key Cases Cited
- Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolff, 44 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2001) (acceleration requires clear notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration)
- Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1991) (strict construction of notices to avoid unintended acceleration)
- Ogden v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982) (notice language that "will accelerate" is notice of intent, not acceleration)
- Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991) (tolling where pendency of proceedings prevents exercise of remedy)
- Pioneer Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Johnston, 117 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1938) (injunctions wrongfully enjoining foreclosure can toll limitations)
- Williams v. Khalaf, 802 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. 1990) (relation-back under section 16.068 can save otherwise time-barred claims when arising from same transaction)
- Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001) (trial court’s docket-management and courtroom administration are within discretion and do not alone show bias)
- Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2005) (invited-error doctrine: a party cannot complain on appeal about action it requested at trial)