Rice v. Miller, 187 A.3d 885

On Feb. 8, 2012 Brian Rice attempted to cross eight-lane Route 70 at night (light snow) a short distance west of the Greentree Road crosswalk and was struck by defendant’s westbound car.
Plaintiff claimed defendant’s headlights were off and that he reasonably crossed; defendant and her passengers testified headlights were on and she was attentive.
Jury found both negligent but apportioned fault 75% to plaintiff and 25% to defendant; trial court entered judgment for defendant under comparative negligence; plaintiff appealed.
At trial Sergeant Ronald Dolan (investigating officer who did not witness collision) testified about scene measurements and applied the Searle formula to estimate the vehicle’s speed; he was not designated as an expert.
Dolan also relayed statements made by defendant and her passenger at the scene; plaintiff objected to both the speed opinion and the hearsay relay.
The trial court charged the jury under both N.J.S.A. 39:4-33 and 39:4-34 (crosswalk/pedestrian statutes); plaintiff argued the court should have taken judicial notice that his crossing was lawful and should not have given one of those charges.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether court should take judicial notice that plaintiff’s crossing was lawful / whether only one pedestrian statute applied	Rice: crossing was lawful and court should judicially notice it; only N.J.S.A. 39:4-34 applies	Defendant: factual dispute about distance/accessibility to crosswalk; statutes are fact-dependent	Court: judicial notice inappropriate; charging both N.J.S.A. 39:4-33 and 39:4-34 was correct because facts were disputed
Whether charging jury with N.J.S.A. 39:4-33 (crosswalk at intersections) was improper	Rice: should not have been charged because he didn’t have to use Greentree crosswalk	Defendant: crosswalk proximity was contested; jury should decide	Court: charging both statutes was proper; jury to resolve accessibility/proximity
Whether Sergeant Dolan’s Searle-formula speed estimate was admissible without expert designation	Rice: inadmissible lay opinion and should have been excluded	Defendant: Dolan had training/experience; useful to jury	Court: admission was error—Searle calculation is beyond lay ken and required expert qualification—but error was harmless given record and counsel’s closing
Whether Dolan could relay statements by defendant/passenger (hearsay)	Rice: officer impermissibly relayed others’ hearsay; should be excluded	Defendant: statements were cumulative and not prejudicial	Court: relaying hearsay was error under controlling precedent but deemed harmless given overall record

State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) (limits on police lay-opinion testimony; expert designation required when testimony rests on out-of-court statements or specialized analysis)
Gonzales v. Hugelmeyer, 441 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2015) (trooper’s opinion about fault inadmissible when based on others’ statements and not offered as expert)
Abad v. Gagliardi, 378 N.J. Super. 503 (App. Div. 2005) (proximity/accessibility of crosswalk can obligate pedestrian to use it; jury may resolve factual question)
Neno v. Clinton, 167 N.J. 573 (2001) (police officer may not present opinions based primarily on eyewitness statements; preserves hearsay rule)
LaBrutto v. State, 114 N.J. 187 (1989) (police may sometimes give lay opinion on point of impact, but limits exist)
State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1970) (harmless error standard)