Rice Lake Harley Davidson v. State of Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission
855 N.W.2d 882
Wis. Ct. App.2014Background
- Diane Mack was hired as a motorcycle salesperson at Rice Lake Harley in 2003; she was terminated in February 2009 and filed a WFEA complaint (pay and termination) on March 23, 2009.
- Mack alleged wage discrimination based on sex, claiming male colleague Harold Dodge was paid substantially more for substantially similar salesperson work.
- Dodge was hired in 2004 at a higher salary as sales manager, demoted to salesperson in Jan. 2005 but retained higher pay; Mack’s pay was lower and fluctuated, with comparable pay to another male (Glinski) only beginning in 2007.
- The ALJ found wage discrimination, awarded back pay (limited by the 2‑year statutory cap) and two‑thirds of requested attorney fees; LIRC affirmed liability and timeliness (relying on Abbyland), added attorney fees, and disavowed direct adoption of the federal Ledbetter Act.
- The circuit court affirmed LIRC but reduced some requested fees to two‑thirds; the court of appeals affirms timeliness and liability, upholds prevailing‑party fee entitlement, and reverses the circuit court for failing to award Mack full appellate/circuit fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mack) | Defendant's Argument (Rice Lake Harley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under Wis. Stat. §111.39(1) | Complaint timely because Mack received discriminatory paychecks within 300 days of filing (paycheck/continuing violation rule per Abbyland) | Complaint untimely; limitations began when discriminatory pay decision was made or when Mack knew of disparity (2004) | Held timely: Abbyland controls — pay discrimination is continuing and a discriminatory paycheck within 300 days makes the complaint timely (due‑weight deference to LIRC) |
| Merits — wage discrimination (prima facie) | Mack: she and Dodge performed equal work (sales core duties); pay disparity was sex‑based and not explained by legitimate factors | Rice Lake: Dodge had additional duties, superior experience, prior higher salary and managerial role that justified higher pay | Held LIRC had credible and substantial evidence to find Mack met prima facie elements and employer failed to prove a non‑sex factor justified disparity for the relevant period (Jan. 2005–Feb. 2009) |
| Prevailing‑party status for attorney fees | Mack: she prevailed on the only claim before ALJ/LIRC/court and obtained back pay — thus a prevailing party entitled to fees | Rice Lake: Mack did not recover most of requested damages, so should not be treated as prevailing or awarded full fees | Held Mack is a prevailing party; fees are appropriate and reduction to reflect proportional recovery is not required here (Hensley guidance considered) |
| Cross‑appeal — quantum of circuit/appellate fees | Mack: circuit court erred reducing circuit fees to two‑thirds based solely on ALJ’s administrative reduction; she fully prevailed in circuit appeal so full fees warranted | Rice Lake: supports reduction based on limited back pay recovery | Held circuit court erroneously exercised discretion; remanded to award Mack full requested fees for circuit/appellate proceedings and to apply lodestar calculation (Mack fully prevailed on appeal) |
Key Cases Cited
- Abbyland Processing v. LIRC, 206 Wis. 2d 309 (Ct. App. 1996) (pay discrimination is a continuing violation; a discriminatory paycheck within the limitations period makes a complaint timely)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (prevailing‑party/fees framework; results obtained factor in fee adjustments)
- Watkins v. LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753 (1984) (WFEA prevailing‑party attorney fee entitlement; private attorney general rationale)
- Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 349 Wis. 2d 234 (2013) (agency factual findings upheld if supported by credible and substantial evidence)
- Bowen v. LIRC, 299 Wis. 2d 800 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussion of Abbyland’s admissibility of pre‑limitation acts to show intent, not inconsistent with Abbyland’s continuing‑violation holding)
- Howard v. Lear Corp., 234 F.3d 1002 (7th Cir. 2000) (Equal Pay Act prima facie elements and employer defenses)