183 Conn. App. 823
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- James Riccio filed for dissolution of marriage from Lisa Riccio after a marriage beginning in 1978; trial occurred over five days and judgment entered May 24, 2017.
- Trial court found plaintiff primarily at fault for the breakdown and dissolved the marriage.
- Financial orders: defendant to pay plaintiff $125/week rehabilitative alimony for 18 months; plaintiff to pay defendant $1/week alimony for 18 months; parties keep their defined benefit plans but court transferred $48,750 from defendant’s Fidelity 401(k) to plaintiff to address disparity.
- Plaintiff retained his Thrift Savings account (~$138,000); defendant retained most of her 401(k) (approximately $240,819).
- Plaintiff appealed, arguing (1) the overall financial orders were inequitable and favored the defendant, (2) the court erred by using the present division method rather than present value for pension valuation, and (3) the court impermissibly “double dipped” by considering the pension both as income for alimony and as an asset in property division.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court abused discretion by making financial orders favoring defendant | Court’s awards assigned most assets and income to defendant; overall scheme inequitable | Court considered statutory factors and assembled a cohesive asset reallocation; disparity not dispositive | No abuse: court considered §46b-81/§46b-82 factors; orders supported by findings and within discretion |
| Appropriate method to value/distribute defined benefit plans (present value v. present division) | Because plaintiff’s pension was in pay status, present value method should have been used | Trial court may choose valuation method case-by-case; present division permissible | No error: trial court did not abuse discretion by using present division method |
| Whether alimony constituted impermissible double dipping | Court relied on pension in both dividing assets and setting alimony, resulting in double counting | Court used plaintiff’s pension income (not pension asset) as part of income to set rehabilitative alimony, which is permitted | No double dipping: court considered pension income, not the asset assigned, so alimony calculation was proper |
| Validity of fault finding supporting financial decisions | Plaintiff contested the court’s factual findings about his conduct (e.g., infidelity, addiction focus) | Trial court’s factual findings are supported by record evidence | Finding not clearly erroneous and thus stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Powell-Ferri v. Ferri, 326 Conn. 457 (general standard of review and family law deference)
- Rozsa v. Rozsa, 117 Conn. App. 1 (statutory criteria for financial orders)
- Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280 Conn. 632 (court must consider §46b-81/§46b-82 factors)
- Kent v. DiPaola, 178 Conn. App. 424 (weighting statutory factors and trial court discretion)
- Kaczynski v. Kaczynski, 124 Conn. App. 204 (no presumption of equal division under §46b-81)
- Barcelo v. Barcelo, 158 Conn. App. 201 (mosaic doctrine: view financial orders as interdependent)
- O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81 (double-dipping explained; assets assigned to payee cannot be counted as source of payor’s payments)
- Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 (three methods for pension valuation: present value, present division, reserved jurisdiction)
- Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733 (trial court discretion in choosing pension valuation method)