RICARLO A. BETTY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
15-1864
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Dec 20, 2017Background
- In 2008 Ricarlo A. Betty was convicted of two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon while masked and sentenced to life on each count; direct appeal affirmed.
- In 2011 Betty filed a post-conviction motion alleging, among other claims, ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise and argue youthful-offender eligibility at sentencing.
- A trial court (not the original sentencing judge) granted relief on the ineffective-assistance claim and ordered a de novo sentencing hearing before the original sentencing judge so youthful-offender status could be considered.
- Betty appealed other denials of post-conviction relief; after that appeal concluded he moved pro se to schedule the de novo sentencing hearing.
- The original sentencing judge denied the motion without a hearing, ruling (1) he lacked jurisdiction after the appeal and (2) a de novo hearing was "unnecessary" because he would not have imposed a youthful-offender sentence even if the argument had been made.
- Betty appealed that denial; the Fourth District reversed, holding Betty was entitled to a de novo sentencing with counsel present and that a different judge must preside to avoid the appearance of prejudgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant was entitled to a de novo resentencing hearing after post-conviction relief granted on ineffective-assistance-at-sentencing for youthful-offender advice | Betty: grant de novo resentencing so he and counsel can present evidence/argument on youthful-offender classification | State: trial court’s order allowed either contacting judge to set hearing or appealing; by appealing other claims Betty waived the hearing; also original judge said hearing unnecessary because he would not impose youthful-offender sentence | Reversed: de novo resentencing required; appellant entitled to presence and counsel; waiver argument rejected |
| Whether resentencing was a ministerial act allowing judge to deny defendant presence and argument | Betty: resentencing requires judicial discretion and is not ministerial when youthful-offender classification is at issue | State: implied resentencing unnecessary and could be foreclosed because original sentence showed intent to impose maximum | Court: resentencing here involves discretion, not ministerial; defendant must be present and heard |
| Whether original sentencing judge could decide outcome before hearing, or must recuse/transfer | Betty: judge must hear evidence before exercising discretion; prior announced view prejudges the issue | State: judge’s statement that he would not impose youthful-offender sentence supported denial | Court: appearance of prejudgment required transfer to a different judge for resentencing |
| Whether defendant’s absence at a critical stage is harmless error | Betty: absence at resentencing is prejudicial without showing beyond reasonable doubt | State: did not successfully show harmlessness | Court: absence is subject to harmless-error standard; here defendant must be present, so reversal required |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2000) (defendant’s right to be present at critical stages extends to resentencing)
- Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 2014) (absence at critical stage is subject to harmless-error analysis; resentencing requires presence unless ministerial)
- Webb v. State, 805 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (defendant entitled to de novo sentencing with full due-process rights when relief granted)
- Burgess v. State, 182 So. 3d 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (defendant must be present and represented at resentencing unless act is ministerial)
- Phillips v. State, 705 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1997) (resentencing is a new proceeding; trial court not bound by prior sentence intentions)
- Orta v. State, 919 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (trial court not obligated to maintain prior sentencing intent at resentencing)