Ricardo Bermudez Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Industries, 824 F.3d 1150

Background

Stoneledge Furniture (subsidiary of Ashley Furniture) paid ~600 California sales associates solely by commission across 14 stores; Plaintiff Ricardo Bermudez Vaquero worked as a sales associate (2010–2012).
Vaquero alleges Stoneledge required non-sales work (e.g., cleaning, meetings, carrying furniture) that was unpaid and thus violated California minimum wage and related wage-statement, waiting-time, and UCL claims.
Vaquero sought to certify four subclasses (minimum-wage shortfalls for non-sales time; missing itemized wage statements; unpaid final wages at separation; unlawful business practices); the district court denied certification for the waiting-time subclass but certified the others under Rule 23(b)(3).
Defendants removed the case to federal court under CAFA and appealed the district court’s certification under Rule 23(f); Ninth Circuit review is for abuse of discretion.
Central legal disputes on appeal: whether Rule 23(a) commonality and Rule 23(b)(3) predominance are satisfied given individualized issues (damages, liability proof), and whether certification would violate the Rules Enabling Act by altering substantive rights via representative evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Commonality under Rule 23(a)(2)	Vaquero: single common contention — Stoneledge misclassified/paid by commission for non‑sales work violating California law; classwide resolution possible.	Stoneledge: claims depend on individualized facts across employees and stores (like Dukes), so no common answer will resolve all claims.	Court: Commonality satisfied; the injury is objective, focused, and capable of classwide resolution.
Predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) (liability/damages)	Vaquero: employer policy caused the harm for all members; individual damages calculations do not defeat predominance; representative evidence and sampling can resolve damages.	Stoneledge: individualized damages and proof prevent common questions from predominating (relies on Comcast).	Court: Predominance satisfied; employer action necessarily caused injury, and individualized damages do not alone defeat certification.
Use of representative/statistical evidence	Vaquero: representative evidence can reliably prove liability and damages classwide; trial mechanisms (surveys, sampling, special master) are available.	Stoneledge: representative sampling would abridge defendants’ substantive rights and preclude individualized defenses; Dukes rejects classwide sampling for individual backpay.	Court: Representative evidence permissible per Tyson Foods; defendants can later challenge sufficiency of evidence; no Rules Enabling Act violation at certification stage.
Rules Enabling Act challenge	Vaquero: class procedure does not change substantive rights; defendants retain defenses and procedural tools.	Stoneledge: Rule 23 certification with representative proof would modify substantive rights by limiting ability to contest individual claims.	Court: No violation; certification doesn’t enlarge/substantively alter rights and district court may structure proceedings to protect defendants.

Key Cases Cited

Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (commonality requires a common contention capable of classwide resolution)
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (class certification requires a damages model that ties damages to the liability theory)
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442 (2016) (representative/statistical evidence may be used to prove class claims if reliable)
Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) (amount of damages alone does not defeat class certification)
Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2013) (individualized damages cannot by itself defeat Rule 23(b)(3) certification)
Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015) (damages must stem from defendant’s conduct that created legal liability)