Rhonda Gann v. Nancy A. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 947

Rhonda Gann applied for DIB and SSI alleging disability beginning July 12, 2011, from combined physical and mental impairments (lumbar fusion/post‑laminectomy pain, degenerative disc disease, migraines, obesity, insomnia, RLS, knee arthritis, depression, and PTSD).
Administrative proceedings: ALJ held a hearing with Gann and a vocational expert (VE); ALJ found severe impairments but determined Gann retained an RFC for a range of sedentary work with physical and nonpublic/limited coworker interaction limits, and denied benefits; Appeals Council denied review; district court affirmed; Gann appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
Medical evidence: multiple providers documented persistent low‑back pain post‑fusion (MRI showing facet spondylosis), use of narcotics, injections, assistive devices, and provider recommendations limiting standing, sitting, lifting, bending; psychiatric providers documented major depressive disorder and PTSD with GAF scores as low as 30 and treatment with multiple psychotropics.
Two psychologists (Drs. Breckenridge and Smith, Psy.D.) opined that Gann had significant adaptive limitations and that her ability to adapt/respond to workplace change was marginal or moderately limited; the ALJ assigned these opinions "significant weight."
The ALJ’s RFC and the hypothetical posed to the VE omitted the psychologists’ adaptation/change‑in‑routine restrictions; the VE nonetheless testified there were sedentary jobs available for the RFC described.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the RFC and VE hypothetical omitted Gann’s work‑adaptation limitations	Gann: ALJ failed to include credible adaptive limitations (opined by two psychologists) in RFC and hypothetical, so VE testimony is not substantial evidence	Commissioner: ALJ permissibly formulated RFC and hypothetical; VE testimony supports availability of jobs	Court: Held ALJ omitted adaptation limitations despite giving those opinions weight; VE testimony therefore not substantial evidence; remand required
Whether VE testimony based on the ALJ’s hypothetical constituted substantial evidence of jobs in the national economy	Gann: Because hypothetical was incomplete, VE’s testimony cannot be relied on	Commissioner: VE answers to hypothetical establish other work exists	Court: Because hypothetical lacked significant, credited limitations, VE testimony does not constitute substantial evidence

Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 2015) (standards for appellate review of ALJ disability findings)
Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577 (8th Cir. 2001) (Social Security factfinding and substantial evidence standard)
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2001) (court must consider evidence that detracts from Commissioner’s decision)
Vandenboom v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2005) (two inconsistent positions from evidence; appellate deference rule)
Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001) (five‑step disability evaluation)
Pate‑Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2009) (step four and RFC relevance)
Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003) (RFC determination must consider all relevant evidence)
Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2010) (ALJ bears primary responsibility for RFC)
Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2004) (use of VE testimony to satisfy Commissioner’s burden)
Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 2004) (VE testimony is substantial evidence only when based on properly phrased hypothetical)
Smith v. Shalala, 31 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1994) (hypothetical must comprehensively describe claimant’s limitations for VE to assess job availability)