Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co.
357 F. Supp. 3d 129
| D.R.I. | 2018Background
- MTBE is a synthetic gasoline oxygenate used widely from the 1990s onward; it is highly water‑soluble, persistent, and contaminates drinking water at very low concentrations.
- Rhode Island alleges widespread MTBE contamination of its groundwater and drinking supplies caused by oil/chemical companies that added MTBE to gasoline and distributed it through common supply chains.
- The State alleges industry knew of MTBE’s environmental risks, engaged in efforts to downplay or delay testing, and continued large‑scale use until states began banning MTBE.
- MTBE and MTBE‑tainted gasoline are fungible and routinely blended during distribution, making molecular source‑tracing to a particular producer infeasible.
- Procedural posture: State sued multiple defendants in federal court (diversity); defendants moved to dismiss. Court allowed discovery to proceed on all claims except public‑trust and certain USTFRA claims; denied personal‑jurisdiction dismissal for Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc. (TPRI).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Notice (Rule 8) | Complaint gives sufficient factual notice of statewide MTBE contamination. | Pleading lacks site‑specific dates/locations. | Complaint meets Rule 8; dismissal denied. |
| Article III Standing | State alleges concrete present and imminent injury to waters it protects. | Injury allegations are too generalized/speculative. | Standing plausibly pleaded; injury in fact and imminence adequate. |
| Causation / Apportionment | Fungibility and blended supply chain make apportionment impossible; defendants should bear burden. | State fails to identify which defendant caused specific contamination; causation speculation. | Court adopts exception: State must plead causation generally; burden to apportion shifts to defendants in these circumstances. |
| Strict Liability / Failure to Warn | Defendants owed duty to warn foreseeable users including the State. | No distinct duty running to state entities beyond private consumers. | Duty to warn extends to the State as a consumer; claim survives. |
| Public Nuisance | Widespread contamination unreasonably interferes with public rights; defendants controlled instrumentality. | Lead Industries decision limits public‑nuisance suits where defendant lacked control at time of harm. | Nuisance claims survive because complaint alleges defendant control over supply chain when releases occurred. |
| Trespass / Parens Patriae | State may sue for trespass to protect citizens’ possessory interests and natural resources. | State lacks possessory interest in private lands/wells it seeks to remediate. | State may proceed parens patriae to vindicate quasi‑sovereign interests and seek relief for invasions of private possessory interests. |
| Public‑Trust Doctrine | State seeks trustee relief for groundwater. | Public‑trust remedy should not be extended to groundwater absent state law. | Claim dismissed: Rhode Island public‑trust doctrine does not (yet) encompass groundwater. |
| UST Financial Responsibility Act (USTFRA) | State seeks fund restoration and subrogation under statute. | Statutory prerequisites not satisfied; claims not in statute’s scope. | USTFRA claims dismissed: no compliance‑order theory pleaded and subrogation theory fails because State asserted only its own rights. |
| Water Pollution Act (WPA) | Defendants negligently/intentionally polluted groundwater; WPA creates liability. | Defendants contest causation and other elements. | WPA claim survives; State pleaded negligent and intentional pollution. |
| Personal Jurisdiction (TPRI) | TPRI placed MTBE into distribution stream serving Rhode Island; purposeful availment. | Contacts insufficient for jurisdiction; product reached state via distribution chain. | Court finds minimum contacts and reasonableness; personal jurisdiction over TPRI upheld. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pérez‑Acevedo v. Rivero‑Cubano, 520 F.3d 26 (1st Cir.) (pleading standard at motion‑to‑dismiss stage)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing: general factual allegations may suffice at pleading stage)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (imminence requirement in standing)
- State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I.) (public‑nuisance framework and control requirement)
- Almonte v. Kurl, 46 A.3d 1 (R.I.) (causation and ‘‘but‑for’’ standard in Rhode Island tort law)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 126 A.3d 266 (N.H.) (permitting modified causation/apportionment theory for MTBE contamination)
- Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716 (R.I.) (seller’s duty to warn of foreseeable dangers)
- Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction)
- J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (jurisdictional limits for products in stream of commerce)
- Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (parens patriae and state protection of natural resources)
- Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (state may sue to protect inhabitants from interstate pollution)