Reyes Ex Rel. E.M. v. Manor Independent School District, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4043

Background

E.M., a student with severe intellectual disabilities and autism, attended Manor ISD; he turned 18 in August 2010 and began attending the district just before his 18th birthday.
E.M. exhibited aggressive behavior at school; his parents met repeatedly with the District and then notified the District in May 2012 that he would transfer to a specialized school.
E.M.’s mother filed an IDEA due process complaint in February 2013; the District challenged her authority because E.M. had reached majority in 2010.
By April 2013 the parents obtained a state-court order declaring E.M. incompetent and appointing them guardians, curing the capacity defect and allowing the hearing to proceed.
The hearing officer held most IDEA claims time-barred under Texas’s one-year due-process limitations rule, used the February 2013 filing date (when mother filed) as operative once guardianship was later obtained, and found no IDEA violation within the timely period.
E.M. sued in federal court asserting IDEA and Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) claims; the district court granted judgment on the administrative record dismissing most IDEA claims as time-barred and holding Rehabilitation Act claims were not administratively exhausted. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether most IDEA claims are barred by Texas’s one-year due-process limitations	E.M. argued the limitations period should reach further back (invoking 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(2) and Texas tolling for "unsound mind")	District argued Texas Administrative Code § 89.1151(c) imposes a one-year limit and E.M. did not timely pursue many claims	Court held most claims are time-barred; §1415(m)(2) does not help because Texas has not adopted the specific procedure and guardianship cured the capacity defect; general state tolling not incorporated into IDEA limitations scheme
Whether Texas Estates/General tolling for incapacity applies to extend IDEA deadlines	E.M. invoked Texas civil tolling for persons of unsound mind	District argued IDEA prescribes the applicable limitations regime and does not incorporate general state tolling provisions	Held that the specific state IDEA due-process deadline governs; courts cannot borrow general state tolling to extend IDEA administrative deadlines
Whether Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) claims were administratively exhausted	E.M. argued he pleaded Rehab Act claims before the hearing officer and exhaustion was satisfied; alternatively, exhaustion would have been futile	District argued Rehab Act claims were not included in the prehearing request for relief and thus there was no administrative decision to exhaust	Held that pleading alone was insufficient; exhaustion requires an administrative decision; futility and other exhaustion-avoidance arguments were forfeited because not raised below
Whether Rehab Act claims fall outside IDEA exhaustion requirement (i.e., do not overlap)	E.M. argued some Rehab Act claims were distinct from IDEA claims and thus need not be exhausted	District argued Rehab Act claims overlapped with IDEA because they challenged the education and school responses to behavior	Held they overlap and thus are subject to IDEA exhaustion; court applied the Fry test and concluded claims are education-centered and must be exhausted administratively

Key Cases Cited

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (U.S. 1988) (administrative exhaustion may be excused in futility circumstances)
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (U.S. 2012) (the specific governs the general in statutory interpretation)
Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993) (discusses tolling for disability and suits brought after removal of legal incapacity)
Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1993) (appellate courts generally do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal)
Gardner v. Sch. Bd. Caddo Par., 958 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1992) (discusses exhaustion under IDEA and limited exceptions)