735 F.3d 1018
8th Cir.2013Background
- Reyco Granning LLC appeals a district court grant of summary judgment in favor of Local 245 and denial of Reyco’s cross-motion to vacate an arbitrator’s award under the CBA.
- The CBA’s Article XII, section 3 provides that holiday pay requires eight hours on the last scheduled workday before the holiday, with a tardiness exception if late less than 60 minutes.
- Tiffini DePalma was denied holiday pay after arriving 45 minutes late on December 22, 2011 due to a flat tire; Reyco denied the exception, claiming insufficient attendance history.
- The grievance proceeded to arbitration; the arbitrator found that Reyco had discretion to grant the tardiness exception, but that the parties intended limits allowing exception for vehicle trouble, oversleeping, or car wrecks.
- The arbitrator ordered DePalma’s holiday pay under the exception; Reyco sought review and both sides moved for summary judgment.
- The district court upheld the arbitrator’s decision and granted Local 245 summary judgment; this court vacates and remands to grant Reyco summary judgment and vacate the award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the arbitrator exceeded authority by relying on bargaining history. | Reyco argues the term 'may' is unambiguous and the arbitrator modified the contract by considering negotiation history. | Local 245 contends the arbitrator could rely on external sources when language is ambiguous or when further guidance is needed. | Arbitrator exceeded authority by altering unambiguous language. |
| Whether the word 'may' in Article XII, section 3 is ambiguous and allows outside guidance. | Reyco asserts 'may' is an unambiguous discretionary grant to Reyco. | Local 245 maintains 'may' is ambiguous and allows look to negotiation history. | Term unambiguous; arbitrator's reliance on outside history improper. |
| Whether the district court correctly reviewed the award under de novo standards for summary judgment and vacatur. | Reyco argues de novo review should lead to vacating the award due to no authority. | Local 245 argues de novo or limited review supports sustaining arbitration. | District court’s vacatur of the award was correct; the arbitrator exceeded authority. |
Key Cases Cited
- Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers, 309 F.3d 1075 (8th Cir. 2002) (extraordinary deference to arbitral awards; draw its essence from the agreement)
- Keebler Co. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Emps. Union, Local No. 471, 80 F.3d 284 (8th Cir. 1996) (arbitrator overstepping by altering contract terms; cannot substitute discretion)
- Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1988) (vacate when arbitrator disregards contract language)
- Manhattan Coffee Co. v. Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 743 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1984) (arbitrator cannot substitute his discretion for the parties’)
- Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Communication Conference, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 729 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2013) (arbitrator arguably construed or applied the CBA; defer to arbitrator)
- Excel Corp. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 131, 102 F.3d 1464 (8th Cir. 1996) (arbitrator may consider parol evidence when language ambiguous)
- Dist. No. 72 & Local Lodge 1127 v. Teter Tool & Die, 630 F.Supp. 732 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (vacating where arbitrator relied on intent at contract time over language)
- The Star Tribune Co. v. Minn. Newspaper Guild Typographical Union, 450 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 2006) (vacate when arbitrator ignores plain language of an unambiguous contract)
- Misco, United States, 484 U.S. 29 (U.S. Supreme Court 1987) (arbitration deference; 'construction of the contract' principle)
- Alcan Packaging Co., 729 F.3d 839, 729 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2013) (discusses deference when arbitrator arguably construes the contract)
