Resource Investments, Inc. v. United States, 785 F.3d 660

Resource Investments sought a federal Clean Water Act permit for a Washington landfill, which the Corps denied in 1996 after an EIS process.
Resource Investments challenged the denial in federal district court under the APA in 1996; the district court upheld the denial, and the Ninth Circuit later reversed on authority grounds.
Resource Investments filed a takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims in 1998 alleging the permit denial was a taking and sought compensation.
While the takings case was pending, the Supreme Court issued Tohono O’Odham Nation (2011), holding that suits based on substantially the same operative facts are barred by § 1500 regardless of relief sought.
The Claims Court, after considering Tecon Engineers and related precedent, dismissed the takings claim as barred by § 1500 due to substantially overlapping operative facts with the earlier district court action.
Resource Investments argues the denial was only an operative fact for a permanent takings claim and that a temporary takings theory survives, but the court did not reach that issue because the complaint did not adequately plead temporary taking and the action was time-of-filing barred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1500 bars the Claims Court action	Resource Investments contends the district court action and the Claims Court action do not share the same operative facts.	The government argues both suits arise from the same denial of the CWA permit and related economic injury.	Yes, barred under § 1500.
Whether the temporary takings claim survives	Resource Investments says temporary takings stem from permitting delays, not denial.	Defendant asserts the issue is barred as § 1500 jurisdictional bar applies; independent pleading deficiencies also exist.	Not reached; dismissed for pleading and jurisdiction reasons.
Whether the overlap is governed by modern transactional res judicata or the older act/contract test	Resource Investments emphasizes potential differences in operative facts.	The court applies the transactional test under Tohono and Keene to assess substantial overlap.	Overlap found; § 1500 bar applies.
Whether Tecon Engineeers law governs filing rules here	Resource Investments argues Tecon may permit refiling without constitutional issue.	Tecon governs first-to-file rule for § 1500 and remains good law.	Tecon remains controlling; no constitutional flaw.

Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (preclusion-based comparison under § 1500; operative facts matter for same claim)
Tohono O’Odham Nation v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011) (two suits barred if based on substantially the same operative facts regardless of relief)
Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (res judicata-like approach to § 1500 analysis; same conduct can support multiple theories)
Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (time-of-filing rule; governs § 1500 applicability)
Harbuck v. United States, 378 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (operational facts shared across claims bar under § 1500)
Hagee v. City of Evanston, 729 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1984) (transactional view; preclusion applies to related complaints)
Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2012) (same underlying transaction supports § 1500 bar)
Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2009) (same transaction doctrine in § 1500 context)
Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (background vs. operative facts; applies time-of-filing rule)
Aurora City v. West, 74 U.S. 82 (1868) (early res judicata principles informing § 1500)