796 F. Supp. 2d 900
M.D. Tenn.2011Background
- MOA under § 287(g) between ICE and Metro via DCSO, authorizing DCSO to perform immigration-enforcement duties under ICE supervision.
- Renteria-Villegas held at CJC with an ICE hold after arrest; birthplace confusion led to continued detention under 287(g) program.
- Gutierrez-Turcios arrested, detained on ICE hold and interrogated under the MOA; potential future ICE interactions anticipated.
- Renteria filed state court declaratory-judgment claims challenging MOA under Charter and Poe, later amended to remove ICE as defendant.
- Chancery Court found ICE indispensable under state law and allowed amendment to add ICE; federal removal followed.
- This case was removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief; several motions to dismiss were briefed; the court later granted leave to amend and denied remaining motions as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to pursue declaratory/injunctive relief | Renteria and Gutierrez have an ongoing interest in MOA and its effects. | Metro contends lack of immediate threat and absence of Article III standing. | Plaintiffs have standing under state law and, for purposes of removal, meet standing requirements; amendment granted. |
| Amendment viability given standing concerns | Amendment cures standing defects; targets MOA impact. | Standing or procedural defects may bar amendment. | Court allowing the Third Amended Complaint; amendment not futile. |
| Whether MOA violates the Charter | MOA grants DCSO powers beyond Charter limits. | MOA complies with Charter or remains subject to state-law interpretation. | Court will address in relation to the Third Amended Complaint; standing and mootness arguments pending. |
| Indispensable party and removal posture | ICE is indispensable due to MOA involvement; remove to federal court permissible. | ICE nominal defendant; not indispensable after removal; mootness concerns. | Court treats removal posture as controlled by § 1442(a)(1); mootness of some motions upon amendment. |
| Mootness of motions to dismiss and preliminary injunction | Amendment renders prior dismissals moot; injunction context depends on operative complaint. | Motions to dismiss and injunction should proceed or be resolved on the current pleadings. | Motions to dismiss and the Preliminary Injunction denied as moot; leave to file motions on Third Amended Complaint permitted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing is essential; must have Article III injury present at filing)
- City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2007) (removal mechanics; agency removal authority; standing relevance in removal)
- Aarti Hospitality, LLC v. City of Grove City, 350 Fed.Appx. 1 (6th Cir. 2009) (state-law standing with federal pendant claims; jurisdictional issues via removal)
- Int'l Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991) (standing should be seen as a question of substantive law applicable to the case)
- Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2008) (Tennessee Declaratory Judgment Act permits declarations where controversy exists)
- Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982) (state-law standing determine access to relief; supportive for standing analysis)
- Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076 (6th Cir. 2010) (removal; state-law standing persists under removal; substantive law unaffected by removal)
- Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 2001) (standing for declaratory/injunctive relief; threshold requirement)
- City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (requires real and immediate threat for injunctive relief; standing analysis context)
- Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (rare circumstances where declaratory relief may be granted without injunctive relief)