Rendon, Michael Eric
PD-0013-15
| Tex. App. | Mar 3, 2015Background
- Police canine-handler Detective Jason Stover and drug-detection dog Baco conducted a free-air sniff outside Apartment C at a four-plex in Victoria, Texas, on May 8, 2012; the dog alerted at the apartment door.
- Officers were initially denied consent to search, left to obtain a warrant, executed the warrant, and found marijuana.
- At the suppression hearing the trial court found the landing/passageway immediately outside Rendon’s apartment was curtilage and granted the motion to suppress; the State appealed.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the sniff occurred within the apartment’s curtilage and was therefore a Fourth Amendment search.
- The State argues (to the Court of Criminal Appeals) the landing was a common area (tenant lacked exclusive control to exclude others), so the open-air canine sniff was from a lawful vantage point and not a search.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Rendon) | Held (Court of Appeals) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the landing outside Rendon’s apartment is curtilage | Landing is a common area; Rendon lacked power to exclude others, so it cannot be curtilage | Landing is functionally part of the apartment’s curtilage because it abuts his unit and was used by tenants | Landing is curtilage; sniff was within curtilage and a Fourth Amendment search |
| Whether a canine free-air sniff from a lawful common area implicates the Fourth Amendment | Canine sniffs from lawful vantage points are not searches; odors exposed to public carry no privacy expectation | A canine sniff at the door (as in Jardines) intrudes on curtilage and is a search | Court of Appeals treated the sniff as a curtilage search and suppressed evidence |
| Role of exclusive control/power to exclude in curtilage analysis | Exclusive control (ability to exclude) is a threshold requirement for curtilage in apartment settings | Proximity to the unit and tenant use support curtilage designation without exclusive exclusion | Court of Appeals found facts supported curtilage despite lack of tenant exclusion power (trial court finding accepted) |
| Applicability of Kyllo to canine olfaction | Kyllo does not apply because drug-detection dogs and olfaction are neither novel nor technology restricted to government; smell from a lawful vantage point is permitted | Use of a trained dog at the door is a targeted investigative intrusion into curtilage akin to the intrusion in Jardines | Court of Appeals treated this sniff under curtilage/property-trespass analysis rather than Kyllo-tech analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (canine sniff at front door implicated curtilage via physical intrusion/trespass analysis)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of novel thermal imaging at a home may be a search)
- California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (aerial observation of curtilage from public airspace upheld)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (four-factor curtilage test: proximity, enclosure, use, steps to protect from observation)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protects people’s reasonable expectations of privacy)
- Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (canine sniff of a vehicle during a lawful stop did not constitute a search)
- State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (canine sniff not a search if conducted from a place officers had the right to be)
- State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (officer cannot make a warrantless home entry based solely on the smell of narcotics, but smell can contribute to probable cause)
- Albro v. State, 502 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (plain view/observation from lawful vantage point can justify subsequent entry)
- Ochs v. State, 543 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (observation through an open door supported lawful action)