386 F. Supp. 3d 602
W.D. Pa.2019Background
- Plaintiffs pursued both an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23 class action alleging off-the-clock work by mortgage loan officers at Citizens Bank.
- The Third Circuit issued a precedential opinion (Reinig) holding that Rule 23 class certification and FLSA § 216(b) collective certification are not "inextricably intertwined" and that their standards differ.
- Defendant moved to decertify the FLSA collective after the Third Circuit opinion; the motion effectively asked the district court to reconsider its prior FLSA certification decision in light of the appellate opinion.
- The district court reviewed the applicable standard for motions for reconsideration and for interlocutory orders, noting relief is limited to intervening controlling law, new evidence, or clear error/manifest injustice.
- The court found no intervening controlling law favorable to Defendant, no new evidence, and no clear error—declining to revisit its factual finding that opted-in plaintiffs are "similarly situated."
- The court denied Defendant’s renewed motion to decertify without prejudice, set a single-issue jury trial on whether Citizens Bank had a policy/practice causing loan officers to work "off the clock," and preserved the parties’ rights to re-raise decertification after trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Reinig means FLSA collective must be decertified | FLSA collective standard differs from Rule 23; original certification valid | Reconsideration urged because appellate opinion addressed Rule 23 and may affect FLSA certification | Denied—Reinig confirmed standards differ and did not mandate decertification |
| Whether there is an intervening change in controlling law | No change that invalidates certification | Cites Ninth Circuit Campbell as conflicting authority | Denied—Campbell is inapposite and inconsistent with controlling Third Circuit opinion |
| Whether new evidence warrants reconsideration | No new evidence | Asserts prior factual findings should be reexamined | Denied—no new evidence presented |
| Whether clear error or manifest injustice exists | Prior factual findings that plaintiffs are similarly situated were correct | Claims prior rulings were erroneous and seeks correction | Denied—court finds no clear error; allows renewal after single-issue trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Reinig v. RBS Citizens, 912 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rule 23 and FLSA § 216(b) certification standards are distinct)
- Zavala v. Walmart, 691 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2012) (factors for FLSA "similarly situated" inquiry)
- Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1981) (limits on pendent appellate jurisdiction)
- United States v. Aleynikov, 765 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing scope of plenary appellate review)
- Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2010) (standards for motions for reconsideration)
- Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1985) (grounds for reconsideration)
- Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 1999) (reconsideration relief limited to narrow grounds)
- Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018) (Ninth Circuit approach to FLSA collective certification; considered inapposite by district court)
- Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1984) (bifurcation and judicial economy)
- Oldershaw v. DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (D. Colo. 2017) (bifurcating FLSA from state-law claims)
