REID v. MORRIS, 309 Ga. 230

Background

On Sept. 1, 2016, Lakenin Morris (drunk) was driving Keith Stroud’s car and collided with Alonzo Reid, who was injured; Morris later pled guilty to DUI.
Stroud had given Morris the car keys despite knowing Morris was intoxicated, unlicensed, and reckless; Reid sued Morris (negligence) and Stroud (negligent entrustment).
Both defendants were found liable (Morris by default; Stroud on summary judgment). The trial court awarded Reid ~ $23,000 in compensatory damages, apportioned equally under OCGA § 51-12-33.
The trial court found punitive-damage predicates met by clear and convincing evidence and awarded $50,000 punitive damages against Morris, but declined to award punitive damages against Stroud, relying on appellate decisions construing OCGA § 51-12-5.1(f) to limit uncapped punitive awards to the DUI driver as the “active tort-feasor.”
Reid appealed, arguing (1) the trial court misinterpreted § 51-12-5.1(f) and (2) the statute (as so interpreted) implicated a jury-trial right; the Supreme Court considered statutory interpretation and remanded for further factfinding on Stroud’s status under § 51-12-5.1(f).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Reid)	Defendant's Argument (Stroud/Morris / trial-court view)	Held
Whether “active tort-feasor” in OCGA § 51-12-5.1(f) is limited to the DUI driver	"Active tort-feasor" is not limited to the driver; statute’s plain language reaches any defendant whose intoxication substantially impaired judgment and whose conduct was "active."	Prior appellate decisions treated the DUI driver as the only "active tort-feasor" entitled to uncapped punitive damages.	The Court rejects a categorical rule; "active tort-feasor" is not necessarily limited to the DUI driver.
Whether the trial court erred in categorically denying punitive damages against Stroud	Trial court erred by refusing to consider punitive damages against Stroud based on a mistaken categorical interpretation.	Trial court relied on Capp/Corrugated to bar punitive damages against non-driver owner.	Court vacated that portion of the judgment and remanded for determination whether Stroud was intoxicated enough to substantially impair judgment and whether his conduct was "active."
Whether prior appellate decisions (Capp, Corrugated, Giddens) are dispositive	They do not establish a mandatory, categorical rule restricting § 51-12-5.1(f).	Those cases were interpreted to bar punitive awards against non-driver defendants in DUI contexts.	To the extent they hold a categorical rule, they are disapproved; fact-specific inquiry required.
Constitutional jury-trial claim (Reid) that § 51-12-5.1(f) violates right to jury	Argued statute (as interpreted) infringes inviolate right to jury trial under Ga. Const. Art. I, § I, ¶ XI(a).	Trial court rejected the constitutional challenge; Supreme Court left the question for another day.	Court did not resolve the constitutional jury-trial issue here and left it for future consideration.

Key Cases Cited

McClure v. Gower, 259 Ga. 678 (1989) (explains structure and interplay of § 51-12-5.1 subsections)
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539 (1993) (describes the statute’s three-tier punitive-damages scheme)
Capp v. Carlito’s Mexican Bar & Grill #1, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 779 (2007) (appellate decision previously interpreted § 51-12-5.1(f) to limit uncapped punitive awards in DUI cases)
Corrugated Replacements, Inc. v. Johnson, 340 Ga. App. 364 (2017) (similar appellate interpretation relied on below)
Peacock Constr. Co. v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 121 Ga. App. 711 (1970) (distinction between active and passive tort-feasors in indemnity/contribution context)
American Material Svcs. v. Giddens, 296 Ga. App. 643 (2009) (applied Capp in DUI-context punitive-damages analysis)
Jova/Daniels/Busby, Inc. v. B & W Mech. Contractors, 167 Ga. App. 551 (1983) (negligence being active vs. passive is typically a fact question for the trier of fact)
Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559 (1980) (questions of negligence are ordinarily for the jury)