474 P.3d 1179
Alaska Ct. App.2020Background
- Reid Duard Hayes was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of first- and second-degree sexual abuse and attempted second-degree sexual abuse based on abuse of three underage daughters of his then-girlfriend.
- The children were forensically interviewed at Alaska CARES in January 2012; video-recorded interviews of N.E. and K.E. were later played at trial under Alaska Evid. R. 801(d)(3).
- At the time of the recorded interviews N.E. was 13; by trial she was over 18. K.E. had also turned 16 by trial, but Hayes did not object to K.E.’s video on the age-timing ground.
- Hayes raised six appellate claims: (1) the Rule 801(d)(3) age requirement applies at trial rather than at recording; (2) interviews conducted by investigating officers are per se inadmissible; (3) the State’s child-abuse expert testimony was improper; (4) admission of N.E.’s testimony that Hayes said he had been molested was improper propensity evidence; (5) the court erred by denying discovery of Tiburon police reports; and (6) a probation condition was unconstitutionally vague.
- The superior court admitted the CAC videos after making foundational findings under Rule 801(d)(3), allowed the expert testimony, and imposed sentence (39 years plus probation). The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hayes) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "victim ... who is less than 16 years" in Evid. R. 801(d)(3) refers to age at trial or age at recording | Phrase should be read as present-tense applying at time of trial; thus N.E.’s video inadmissible because she was >16 at trial | The phrase describes the victim as captured in the recording; age must be <16 at time the statement was made | Age requirement applies to the victim’s age when the recording was made; rule admits N.E.’s recording |
| Whether interviews by police investigators involved in the case are per se inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(3) | Police investigators’ involvement creates undue influence and should be a per se bar to admissibility | Rule does not expressly bar investigators; legislature contemplated law enforcement participation; courts should assess influence case-by-case | Not per se inadmissible; police interviewer is a relevant factor for assessing undue influence under subsections (F) and (H) |
| Admissibility of State’s child sexual-abuse expert testimony | Expert testimony functioned as a ‘‘human polygraph’’ and amounted to impermissible profiling of victims | Expert testimony about disclosure dynamics and typical victim behavior is permissible to rebut defense theory and aid jurors | Trial court did not abuse its discretion; testimony fell within permissible scope and safeguards were observed |
| Admissibility of N.E.’s testimony that Hayes said he had been molested as a child | Testimony was propensity evidence and unfairly prejudicial under Rules 401/403 | Statement was relevant to credibility/context; limited use and cautionary instruction minimized prejudice | Any error was harmless; admission did not require reversal |
| Whether denial of motion to compel Tiburon reports prejudiced defense | Tiburon records could reveal impeaching information (runaway history) critical to fabrication theory | Defense already had similar information from other discovery and did not use it at trial | Any error was harmless because comparable records were produced and defense failed to use them |
| Whether Special Probation Condition 12 (searches for "sexually explicit material") is unconstitutionally vague | Condition overbroad and vague as written | Condition expressly incorporated statutory definition (AS 11.41.455(a)), curing vagueness | No plain error; incorporation of statute renders condition sufficiently definite |
Key Cases Cited
- Augustine v. State, 355 P.3d 573 (Alaska App. 2015) (considered police interviewer issues under Rule 801(d)(3) and directed careful foundational findings)
- Tegoseak v. State, 221 P.3d 345 (Alaska App. 2009) (discussed risk of unconscious interviewer influence and the "Clever Hans" effect)
- L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2001) (recognizes challenges of corroboration in child sexual-abuse cases and role of expert testimony)
- Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska App. 1987) (limits on expert testimony regarding victim behavior and credibility)
- Nelson v. State, 782 P.2d 290 (Alaska App. 1989) (evidence of defendant’s own childhood abuse can be highly prejudicial)
- Diorec v. State, 295 P.3d 409 (Alaska App. 2013) (endorses resolving ambiguous probation search terms by referencing statutory definitions)
- State v. Roman, 590 A.2d 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (statutory-age requirement for recorded child statements is measured at time statement was made)