Regions Bank v. Rhodes, 126 So. 3d 1259

Interstate Citrus Partners filed suit; Paul Rhodes was later substituted as plaintiff and, with court permission, filed a second amended complaint that added Regions Bank as a defendant. The second amended complaint was deemed filed May 27, 2010.
Regions served an offer of judgment / proposal for settlement on Rhodes on June 30, 2010.
The court later entered summary judgment in favor of Regions. Regions then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 based on its June 30 proposal.
Rhodes opposed the fees, arguing Regions’ proposal was premature under Rule 1.442(b) because it was served fewer than 90 days after the action commenced as to Regions.
The trial court denied Regions’ fee motion, holding the proposal was premature and invalid under Rule 1.442(b). Regions appealed.
The appellate court affirmed, finding the proposal was served less than 90 days after the action commenced as to Regions and therefore did not comply with Rule 1.442(b).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Rhodes)	Defendant's Argument (Regions)	Held
Was Regions’ proposal premature under Rule 1.442(b)?	The action as to Regions commenced when Regions was first named (motion for leave to amend), so the June 30 proposal was served earlier than 90 days after commencement.	The action commenced with the original complaint (which did not name Regions), so the June 30 proposal was more than 90 days after commencement.	Proposal was premature: the second amended complaint that named Regions was deemed filed May 27, 2010, so the June 30 offer was less than 90 days later and violated Rule 1.442(b).
Does a defendant’s premature proposal invalidate the offer or is it a harmless technical defect?	A premature proposal is invalid; timing compliance is mandatory under Rule 1.442 and prejudice analysis is irrelevant.	A premature offer should be treated as a harmless technical violation that does not necessarily invalidate the offer.	The court held premature offers are invalid; it rejected the ‘‘harmless technical violation’’ approach and affirmed denial of fees.

Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Madsen, Sapp, Mena, Rodriguez & Co., P.A., 957 So.2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (standard of review for compliance with section 768.79 and rule 1.442 is de novo)
Grip Dev., Inc. v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., 788 So.2d 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (procedural timing for offers governed by rule 1.442)
Timmons v. Combs, 608 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1992) (timing of offers is procedural and subject to rule 1.442)
Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So.2d 223 (Fla. 2007) (strict construction of rule 1.442; technical noncompliance can render offer invalid)
Kuvin v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 797 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (Third DCA decision treating some premature offers as harmless)
Shoppes of Liberty City, LLC v. Sotolongo, 932 So.2d 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (Third DCA decision adopting harmless-violation approach)