759 F.3d 630
6th Cir.2014Background
- In October 2005 a video-store proprietor was shot and killed; eyewitness David Banks saw two men enter, one with a gun. Surveillance showed the gunman wearing a light-colored shirt.
- A backpack recovered nearby contained a light/khaki shirt with gunshot-residue and Coleman’s blood; jeans and a baseball cap in the pack produced DNA matching Williams.
- Banks testified at two preliminary hearings (one for Coleman, one for Williams) and identified Williams at Williams’s preliminary hearing; Banks died before trial.
- After Williams’s arrest he participated in a five-person live lineup; Banks identified Williams "within seconds."
- At trial the prosecution read Banks’s testimony from both preliminary hearings to the jury without objection; Williams was convicted of felony murder and weapons possession and given life.
- Williams pursued federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging (1) Confrontation Clause violations from admission of Banks’s preliminary-hearing testimony, (2) ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to object, and (3) a due-process violation from a suggestive lineup. The district court denied relief; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confrontation Clause — admission of Banks’s testimony from Williams’s preliminary hearing | Williams: testimony was "testimonial" and his cross-examination opportunity was constitutionally inadequate (denied continuance to obtain Coleman's hearing transcript) | State: Banks’s preliminary-hearing testimony was testimonial but Williams had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine at his own preliminary hearing; any error was harmless | Court: State court reasonably held no Confrontation error as to Williams’s own preliminary hearing; denial of continuance did not render prior opportunity inadequate; no relief granted |
| Confrontation Clause — admission of Banks’s testimony from Coleman’s preliminary hearing | Williams: he had no opportunity to cross-examine Banks about Coleman's-hearing testimony, so its admission violated Crawford | State: Williams previously cross-examined Banks at his own hearing; Coleman’s hearing testimony was cumulative | Court: Even assuming error, admission of Coleman-hearing testimony was harmless under Brecht because it was largely cumulative and the case against Williams was strong |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to Banks’s testimony | Williams: counsel unreasonably failed to object, causing prejudice | State: No prejudice because admission was proper or harmless | Court: No Strickland prejudice — state court reasonably concluded any admission error was harmless, so no ineffective-assistance relief |
| Due process — suggestive live lineup | Williams: lineup was suggestive (dark-shirt focus; two dark-shirted participants; one taller), creating substantial likelihood of misidentification | State: lineup not impermissibly suggestive; factors (viewing distance, short delay, prompt ID, counsel present, DNA linking clothing) support reliability | Court: State court reasonably found no substantial likelihood of misidentification; no due-process violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements when declarant unavailable and defendant had no prior opportunity for cross-examination)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (distinguishes testimonial versus nontestimonial statements)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference; petitioner must show state-court decision was objectively unreasonable)
- White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (federal habeas review requires objective unreasonableness, not mere error)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (harmless-error standard for habeas is whether error had "substantial and injurious effect")
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (constitutional error harmless only if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in direct review context)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (factors for assessing prejudice from confrontation-limitations)
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (test for reliability of eyewitness ID under due process)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
- Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (factors for determining likelihood of misidentification)
- Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (confrontation means more than physical confrontation)
- United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (Confrontation Clause precedent regarding opportunity to cross-examine)