Reginald L. Bryant v. State of Florida
148 So. 3d 1251
| Fla. | 2014Background
- Reginald Bryant was convicted of petit theft/felony petit theft and sentenced to five years’ prison even though his scoresheet (17.1 points) required a nonstate prison sanction unless the court made written findings that a nonstate sanction could present a danger to the public under § 775.082(10) (2009).
- The trial court did not make the statutorily required written findings at sentencing and denied a subsequent Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion without entering those findings.
- The Second District (in Bryant v. State) held that because the trial court never articulated written reasons, the failure was not equivalent to reversal of stated (invalid) departure reasons, so the court on remand could again impose an upward departure if it then made proper written findings; the Second District certified conflict with the Fifth District.
- The Fifth District in Goldberg v. State held that where the trial court failed to make the required written findings and failed to correct that omission on a Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, the defendant must be resentenced to a nonstate sanction and the court may not reimpose an upward departure on remand.
- The Florida Supreme Court granted review to resolve the district split and considered whether Shull and Pope (which bar re-justifying a departure on remand when original written reasons are invalid or absent) continue to apply post-CPC and after enactment of § 775.082(10).
- The Court quashed the Second District in Bryant, approved Goldberg, and held that when an upward departure is vacated for lack of written findings under § 775.082(10), the remand must result in a nonstate sanction (no possibility of reimposing the upward departure).
Issues
| Issue | Bryant's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may reimpose an upward departure under § 775.082(10) on remand after failing to make written findings originally | Failure to file written findings is a curable procedural error; on de novo resentencing the court may again impose departure if it then makes the required written findings | Resentencing is a new proceeding; court may impose departure on remand so long as it complies with statute and enters written findings | Court held that failure to provide written findings equates to absence of a valid departure reason; consistent with Shull/Pope, reimposition of upward departure on remand is barred — remand requires nonstate sanction |
| Whether Shull and Pope remain applicable under the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) and § 775.082(10) | Shull/Pope improperly restrict de novo resentencing and judicial discretion post-CPC | Shull/Pope’s rule preventing after-the-fact justifications preserves the statute’s written-finding requirement and appellate review | Court held Shull and Pope remain applicable; statutory written-finding requirement is mandatory and failure requires remand without possibility of upward departure |
Key Cases Cited
- Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1987) (bars trial court from enunciating new reasons for a departure on remand after appellate reversal of original departure reasons)
- Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1990) (when departure sentence reversed for lack of written reasons, remand must be for guidelines sentence; no possibility of departure)
- Bradley James Jackson v. State, 64 So.3d 90 (Fla. 2011) (under CPC, downward departure may be reimposed on remand if valid written reasons are later provided)
- State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985 (Fla. 2008) (resentencing is de novo, but Shull not implicated for habitual-offender context)
- Alfred Floyd Jackson v. State, 478 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 1985) (oral pronouncements insufficient; written reasons required for departure)
- Goldberg v. State, 76 So.3d 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (holds failure to make required written findings precludes reimposition of upward departure on remand)