559 F. App'x 278
5th Cir.2014Background
- King pled guilty to indecency with a child in 1990 in Texas, received deferred adjudication and 10 years’ probation with sex-offender counseling; dismissal and termination occurred in 1996.
- SORA was enacted in 1991 and initially did not require reporting deferred adjudications for indecency with a child; later, 2005 amendments made deferred adjudications reportable.
- In 2006, La Porte enacted residency restrictions prohibiting sex offenders from areas near where children gather; these restrictions were separate from SORA.
- In 2001, King was convicted of two burglaries, sentenced to 20 years, and released on parole in 2008 with a requirement to register as a sex offender and be evaluated for counseling.
- In 2009, King was informed to register and complied; he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the Texas DPS Director and La Porte Police Chief challenging SORA as applied to him; the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants; an amended judgment addressed a claim about the La Porte ordinance; King appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SORA's retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. | King argues SORA as applied is punitive and retroactive. | Defendants rely on Smith v. Doe to argue no ex post facto violation. | SORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. |
| Whether SORA's registration requirements violate procedural due process. | King claims automatic classification without individualized assessment violates due process. | King was already afforded adjudication-based protections; Meza and related precedent support no due process violation. | Procedural due process not violated; convictions provide sufficient process. |
| Whether SORA's registration burden is unconstitutional under substantive due process. | King contends the burdens are excessive in relation to public-safety goals. | Registration burdens are not shocking to conscience and serve legitimate public safety interests. | SORA's registration requirements do not violate substantive due process. |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. Supreme Court (2003)) (retroactive sex-offender registration not punitive)
- Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010) (no due process violation for sex-offender conditions post-conviction)
- Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2004) (substantive due process limits on government conduct)
- Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court (2003)) (due process and public-safety considerations in registration regimes)