Regents of the Univ. of Cal. & Janet Napolitano v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. & Kirstjen Nielsen
298 F. Supp. 3d 1304
N.D. Cal.2018Background
- Multiple plaintiffs challenged the DHS rescission of the DACA program; the government moved to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6). The order follows a January 9, 2018 order that largely addressed jurisdiction and provisional relief.
- Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Fifth Amendment (due process and equal protection), equitable estoppel, and sought declaratory relief.
- The court treated the rescission memorandum as a general statement of policy and analyzed whether notice‑and‑comment rulemaking (5 U.S.C. § 553) or the Regulatory Flexibility Act required additional procedures.
- The court accepted plaintiffs’ factual allegations at the pleading stage regarding an alleged change in DHS’s information‑sharing policy and campaign statements by President Trump as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory purpose.
- Rulings: APA arbitrary/capricious claims (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)) survived; notice‑and‑comment and Regulatory Flexibility Act claims were dismissed; due process claims based on rescission (loss of DACA/renewals) were dismissed but due process claims based on alleged change in information‑sharing survived; equitable estoppel and certain equal protection and declaratory claims were dismissed; some equal protection claims (Individual Plaintiffs and County of Santa Clara) survived.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| APA arbitrary/capricious (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)) | Rescission was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion | Rescission was lawful exercise of discretion | Denied dismissal; plaintiffs likely to succeed under standard applied in Jan 9 order |
| APA notice‑and‑comment / Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. § 553 / § 604) | Rescission is a substantive rule requiring notice and comment and RFA analysis | Rescission is a general statement of policy; original DACA was discretionary and not rulemaking | Granted dismissal; rescission qualifies as policy under Mada‑Luna, no notice required |
| Due process — continued DACA / renewals | Recipients have protected property/liberty interest in continued DACA and renewal based on reliance and agency promises | Deferred action and renewals are discretionary; no entitlement created by DACA or agency FAQs | Granted dismissal; no constitutionally protected interest in continuation/renewals |
| Due process — information‑sharing policy | DHS promised confidentiality; change in policy to permit broader sharing breaches a mutually explicit understanding and shocks the conscience | Policy unchanged; caveat allowed modification; no due process violation | Denied dismissal; facts plausibly plead a protected interest in confidentiality and conscience‑shocking conduct |
| Equitable estoppel | Government should be estopped from rescinding DACA or using applicant data for enforcement because of government promises and reliance | Estoppel rarely runs against government; plaintiffs fail to allege affirmative misconduct beyond negligence | Granted dismissal; plaintiffs did not plausibly allege deliberate lies or pattern of false promises |
| Equal protection — discriminatory intent | Rescission had disparate impact on Latinos/Mexicans and was motivated by President Trump’s campaign statements and an unusual rushed process | Disparate impact alone insufficient; campaign statements are not directly about the rescission; normal administrative change | Denied dismissal for Individual Plaintiffs & Santa Clara; pleadings plausibly infer discriminatory motive at this stage; some state & municipal claims dismissed |
| Declaratory relief (standalone) | Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief on legality of rescission | Government argues standalone claim is redundant | Granted dismissal as duplicative of prayer for relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Mada‑Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.) (repeal of discretionary INS policy was a general statement of policy not requiring notice and comment)
- Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2003) (discretionary immigration relief does not create protected substantive due‑process interests)
- INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (U.S. 1996) (aliens have no substantive due‑process right to discretionary relief)
- Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.) (no protected interest in temporary parole; discretionary relief)
- Romeiro de Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir.) (INS policy recommending deferred action did not create a substantive liberty interest)
- Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (U.S. 2005) (benefit is not a protected entitlement where administrators retain broad discretion)
- Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1972) (entitlement may arise from mutually explicit understandings or rules)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (U.S. 1977) (factors for inferring discriminatory purpose from neutral actions)
- Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir.) (campaign statements admissible to evaluate constitutional claims at pleading stage)
- Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51 (U.S. 1984) (estoppel against government not categorically foreclosed)
- Socop‑Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.) (equitable estoppel against government requires affirmative misconduct such as deliberate lies or a pattern of false promises)
- Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.) (elements for equitable estoppel against the government)