622 S.W.3d 807
Tex.2021Background
- Regency Field Services operates the Tilden acid-gas injection well, injecting hydrogen sulfide/carbon-dioxide injectate into the Wilcox formation beneath McMullen County. Models predicted slow lateral migration but later revised to faster spread.
- Layline discovered hydrogen sulfide in the Horton #1 well (Olmos formation) ~3,300 feet from the injection well in 2012; testing linked the contamination to Regency’s injectate. Layline plugged the well and notified neighbors, including Swift.
- Swift Energy Operating holds nine separate mineral leases near the injection well, including the broad PCQ lease covering most of the Quintanilla Ranch (adjacent to the Horton #1 well). Layline notified Swift in October 2012; Swift intervened in the suit on September 24, 2015.
- Regency moved for summary judgment asserting Swift’s claims were time-barred under the two‑year limitations period. The trial court granted summary judgment; the court of appeals affirmed in part (barred claims as to PCQ lease) and reversed in part.
- The Texas Supreme Court addressed when Swift’s claims accrued for limitations purposes (the legal‑injury rule and related single‑action considerations) and whether Regency conclusively proved accrual earlier than September 24, 2013. The Court held Regency did not meet its summary‑judgment burden and reversed the PCQ portion of the court of appeals’ judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When do claims accrue for limitations? | Accrual follows the legal‑injury rule: claims accrue when wrongful conduct causes a legal injury (even if plaintiff lacks full knowledge). | Accrual occurred earlier (based on discovery at Horton #1, modeling, and plume crossing boundaries), so claims are time‑barred. | Accrual follows the legal‑injury rule; here pleadings and evidence did not conclusively show a legal injury occurred on or before Sept. 24, 2013. |
| May a defendant rely on the plaintiff’s pleadings for a limitations summary judgment? | Pleadings are not summary‑judgment evidence and cannot by themselves defeat limitations analysis. | Defendant may treat pleaded allegations as judicial admissions to define issues for an affirmative‑defense summary judgment. | Court may consider pleadings as judicial admissions for limitations analysis alongside summary‑judgment evidence; but here they did not conclusively establish accrual. |
| Must accrual be determined lease‑by‑lease (single‑action rule vs. separate accruals)? | Swift did not press exceptions; argued accrual governed by general rules and did not urge lease‑by‑lease accrual. | Court of appeals used lease‑by‑lease analysis to bar PCQ claims but not others. | The Court declined to decide whether lease‑by‑lease accrual applies; assumed all claims accrued when the first legal injury occurred and found Regency still failed to prove an accrual date before Sept. 24, 2013. |
| Did Regency conclusively establish accrual (esp. for the PCQ lease) by summary judgment? | Swift: evidence and pleadings do not conclusively show a prior legal injury date. | Regency: modeling, Horton #1 discovery, and related facts establish accrual prior to the cutoff. | Regency failed to conclusively show a legal injury occurred before Sept. 24, 2013; summary judgment was improper as to the PCQ lease. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. 2018) (defendant must conclusively prove when a claim accrued to win limitations summary judgment)
- Town of Dish v. Atmos Energy Corp., 519 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2017) (nuisance accrues when defendant’s conduct first substantially interferes with use and enjoyment)
- Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017) (trespass to a lessee’s non‑possessory mineral rights accrues when those rights are invaded or interfered with)
- Pustejovsky v. Rapid‑Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2000) (single‑action rule: claims arising from the same wrongful conduct are generally one action accruing at first injury)
- Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2001) (pleadings may constitute judicial admissions if clear and unequivocal)
- Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1990) (statutes of limitations purpose and basic accrual principles)