Refugio Ruiz-Cortez v. Glenn Lewellen
931 F.3d 592
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- In 1999 CPD officer Glenn Lewellen arrested Refugio Ruiz‑Cortez for cocaine; Lewellen was the prosecution’s key witness and Ruiz‑Cortez was convicted and imprisoned for about a decade.
- Years later federal investigators uncovered Lewellen’s extensive corruption and crimes (including drug conspiracy and racketeering) and prosecuted him; the government moved to vacate Ruiz‑Cortez’s conviction and the district court granted the motion.
- Ruiz‑Cortez sued Lewellen and the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Brady/Giglio violations (failure to disclose impeachment evidence about Lewellen) and fabrication of evidence; he asserted Monell municipal liability against the City.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the City (dismissing the Monell claim) but allowed the individual‑actor Brady claim against Lewellen to proceed; Lewellen invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial and explained on the record (improperly) that ongoing criminal litigation prevented him from testifying.
- The district court refused Ruiz‑Cortez’s proposed jury instruction explaining when Fifth Amendment invocation is proper, instead permitting a generic instruction that the jury may (but need not) draw an adverse inference. The jury ultimately ruled for Lewellen; posttrial motions and reconsideration followed.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Monell claim but vacated the judgment for Lewellen and remanded for a new trial because (1) the trial court allowed Lewellen to offer improper explanations for invoking the Fifth Amendment and (2) the court failed to instruct the jury about the proper basis for invoking the privilege, producing an unfair trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the City is liable under Monell for employing and supervising paid criminal informants leading to a Brady violation | The City had a custom of using paid criminal informants and negligently supervising them; the Webb Report and Rodriguez’s deep involvement put the City on notice of Brady risks | The City argued no municipal policy or deliberate indifference caused the Brady injury; Lewellen’s rogue criminal conduct was the proximate cause | Affirmed dismissal: plaintiff failed to show deliberate indifference or the required "moving force" causation under Monell |
| Whether Lewellen violated Brady/Giglio by withholding impeachment evidence about his crimes and relationship with informant Rodriguez | Lewellen’s corruption and his pre‑trial conduct with Rodriguez were material impeachment evidence that was withheld and caused Ruiz‑Cortez’s wrongful conviction | Lewellen argued timing was unclear (crimes may have occurred after Ruiz‑Cortez’s prosecution) and the jury could reasonably disbelieve cooperators like Rodriguez | Rule 50 denied (no JMOL): a reasonable jury could credit evidence that crimes occurred after the prosecution; insufficiency of undisputed proof defeats JMOL |
| Whether trial errors require a new trial on Brady claim (Fifth Amendment invocation explanation and jury instruction) | Allowing Lewellen to state an extraneous reason for invoking the Fifth and refusing an instruction explaining when invocation is proper misled the jury and made the trial fundamentally unfair | Lewellen contended explanation was harmless and the generic instruction allowing an adverse inference was sufficient | New trial ordered: court erred in permitting an improper explanation for invoking the privilege and failing to instruct the jury on the limits of the Fifth Amendment, producing unfairness |
| Whether impeachment evidence was immaterial (harmless error) | Given government’s concession when vacating the criminal conviction that without Lewellen’s testimony there was "virtually no admissible evidence," the impeachment evidence was material | Lewellen argued the evidence admitted at trial could support a finding of no Brady violation (harmless) | Court found materiality not close given government’s concession; error was not harmless in context of improper Fifth Amendment handling |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires a municipal policy, custom, or official act that is the moving force behind a constitutional violation)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose favorable evidence material to guilt or punishment)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Brady extends to material impeachment evidence)
- Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (Monell claims based on non‑unconstitutional municipal action require proof of deliberate indifference and direct causation)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (failure‑to‑train/supervise Monell claims require rigorous proof of deliberate indifference and pattern of similar violations)
- Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (civil‑case inferences permitted from a witness’s Fifth Amendment invocation)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (standards for courts reviewing jury verdicts and when to credit/uncredit evidence)