Reeves v. Fancher, 210 So. 3d 595

Background

Parents divorced in 2009; original judgment awarded joint legal custody and (what the court terms) "primary physical custody" to the mother.
Mother notified father under the Alabama Parent‑Child Relationship Protection Act of her intent to relocate with the child to Vicksburg, MS; father objected and sought custody.
The parties settled at an ore tenus hearing and the trial court’s October 6, 2014 judgment permitted the relocation and awarded mother primary physical custody; father did not appeal.
Father filed a new custody‑modification petition on December 4, 2014; an ore tenus hearing was held Feb. 11, 2015, where father presented only the parties’ nine‑year‑old child as a witness and then rested.
Mother moved for a judgment on partial findings (Rule 52(c)) after the father rested, arguing the evidence did not meet the McLendon standard for modifying custody; the trial court denied the motion and later (Aug. 12, 2015) awarded custody to the father.
On appeal the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding the father’s evidence was insufficient to establish a material change in circumstances or that a custody change would materially promote the child’s best interests.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Fancher — father)	Defendant's Argument (Fancher — mother)	Held
Whether the trial court erred in denying mother’s motion for judgment on partial findings under Rule 52(c) after father rested	Father contended the child’s testimony showed a material change (child wanted to live with father) sufficient to modify custody	Mother argued the evidence before the court at that time was insufficient under Ex parte McLendon to show a material change or best‑interest promotion	Court held the denial was error: evidence at time of motion was insufficient to meet McLendon; reversal required
Whether a child’s expressed preference alone can satisfy McLendon’s requirements	Father relied primarily on the child’s expressed desire to return to Alabama	Mother argued child’s preference alone is not dispositive and that the child was adjusting in Mississippi	Court held child’s preference alone is insufficient to overcome the heavy McLendon burden; other supporting evidence required
Whether the court could treat the Act‑approved relocation as a material change justifying custody modification	Father implicitly relied on post‑relocation alleged problems as change	Mother argued the relocation had been approved under the Act and so cannot later be treated as a material change to justify uprooting the child	Court held relocation approved under the Act cannot later be treated as a material change warranting modification based solely on the move
Whether mother’s request for appellate attorney fees should be granted	Mother requested fees on appeal	Mother failed to attach the required itemized statement to support fees	Court denied the fee request for lack of the required itemization

Key Cases Cited

Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala. 1984) (standard for modifying custody awarded to the primary custodial parent)
King Power Equip., Inc. v. Robinson, 777 So.2d 723 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (review of Rule 52(c) motion in bench trial — consider evidence then before court)
Loggins v. Robinson, 738 So.2d 1268 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (Rule 52(c) supplants former involuntary‑dismissal procedure)
Glover v. Singleton, 598 So.2d 995 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (child preference is a factor but not determinative)
Marusich v. Bright, 947 So.2d 1068 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (child preference, alone, insufficient to show material change)
C.E. v. C.C.H., 963 So.2d 131 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (modification reversed where evidence did not show material change or best‑interest promotion)
Ex parte James, 764 So.2d 557 (Ala. 1999) (preservation rules for sufficiency challenges in nonjury trials)