2019 CO 40
Colo.2019Background
- In 2010 the Colorado General Assembly enacted SB 191, adding "mutual consent" provisions to TECDA requiring teacher assignments to have the hiring principal's consent and input from at least two teachers, and creating unpaid leave for nonprobationary teachers who fail to obtain such placements after a set period.
- Rebecca Reeves‑Toney, a nonprobationary DPS teacher who was displaced after medical leave, alleged SB 191’s mutual consent provisions unconstitutionally delegate local boards’ "control of instruction" under Colo. Const. art. IX, § 15 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief (and later back pay).
- The district court found Reeves‑Toney lacked individual standing (relying on this court’s decisions in Johnson and Masters), but concluded she had taxpayer standing because her tax dollars finance teacher salaries tied to employment contracts formed under the challenged procedure, and it denied DPS’s motion to dismiss.
- DPS filed a C.A.R. 21 petition; the Colorado Supreme Court accepted original jurisdiction because the challenge raises a pure legal question of public importance about landmark legislation.
- The Supreme Court held Reeves‑Toney did not allege any unlawful expenditure of taxpayer funds and thus failed to show the required "clear nexus" between her taxpayer status and the challenged action; it made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Reeves‑Toney has standing to challenge SB 191’s mutual consent provisions under the Colorado Constitution (art. IX, § 15) | Reeves‑Toney: as a taxpayer she may sue because tax dollars finance teacher salaries and contracts formed under the challenged statute | DPS: Reeves‑Toney lacks standing—no individual property interest in continued pay and no taxpayer injury because she alleges no unlawful expenditure of public funds | Court: Reeves‑Toney lacks individual standing (per Johnson/Masters) and lacks taxpayer standing because she alleged no unconstitutional expenditure; dismissal directed |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 P.3d 711 (Colo. 2018) (nonprobationary teachers placed on unpaid leave have no vested property interest in salary and benefits)
- School Dist. No. 1 v. Masters, 413 P.3d 723 (Colo. 2018) (TECDA unpaid‑leave provisions do not create contractual or property rights for nonprobationary teachers)
- Hickenlooper v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 338 P.3d 1002 (Colo. 2014) (taxpayer standing requires a clear nexus: an alleged unlawful expenditure of taxpayer money)
- Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238 (Colo. 2008) (standing is a threshold question; injury in fact and legally protected interest required)
- Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982) (taxpayer standing is based on economic interest in having tax dollars spent constitutionally)