Reese v. Ford Motor Co.
320 Ga. App. 78
Ga. Ct. App.2013Background
- Mary Reese died after a November 2002 rear-end collision with a dump truck; Reese’s children and estate sued Ford in Cobb County.
- A jury initially awarded $3 million to plaintiffs, but Ford appealed for an improper jury instruction; this Court reversed in 2009.
- After a second trial, Ford received a defense verdict and judgment was entered on November 5, 2010.
- Post-judgment, plaintiffs learned of Young v. Ford Motor Co. and Ford’s sanction for a similar discovery response in excess-insurance matters.
- On July 1, 2011, plaintiffs sought an extraordinary motion for new trial based on Ford’s failure to identify insurance carriers in discovery, allegedly influencing juror qualification.
- The trial court granted the extraordinary motion, finding Ford’s discovery response misleading and that jurors were not properly qualified; the court noted Ford’s limited self-insurance and the need to disclose carriers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether extraordinary motion for new trial was proper. | Reese argues Ford misled discovery; juror qualification was flawed. | Ford contends discovery response was accurate and within permissible bounds. | Trial court did not abuse discretion; extraordinary motion affirmed. |
| Whether misrepresentation in discovery warrants new trial. | Misleading responses prevented proper juror qualification. | Responses did not amount to improper concealment of insurance relationships. | Misleading discovery responses supported new-trial relief. |
| Whether the record shows Ford’s self-insurance affected the verdict eligibility. | Lack of carrier disclosure affected juror understanding of insurance interplay. | Self-insurance limits were acknowledged; excess coverage would be involved only if needed. | Discretionary basis for new trial was satisfied by inadequate disclosure. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mountain Creek Hollow v. Cochran, 270 Ga. App. 612 (Ga. App. 2004) (extraordinary motions focus on sound discretion and reasons beyond 30-day period)
- Davis v. State, 283 Ga. 438 (Ga. 2008) (abuse-of-discretion standard for extraordinary motions)
- Gilpin v. Swainsboro Ice & Fuel Co., 75 Ga. App. 574 (Ga. App. 1947) (extraordinary motion discretion; noninterference absent manifest abuse)
- Elgin v. Swann, 315 Ga. App. 809 (Ga. App. 2012) (mootness as basis for dismissal of appeal)