258 A.3d 807
Del.2021Background
- Reed was charged with murder and related firearm offenses; he pleaded guilty to manslaughter and no contest to a firearm-count while the State nol-prossed remaining charges. The plea colloquy was found to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
- Eight days after the plea Reed sent a letter asking to withdraw it and instructed counsel to file a pre-sentencing Rule 32(d) motion; counsel declined, believing no "fair and just" legal basis existed and that new evidence would be required.
- The Superior Court declined to consider pro se filings from a represented defendant; Reed was sentenced to an aggregate term of Level V incarceration (unsuspended portion totaling twenty years).
- Reed filed a Rule 61 postconviction motion alleging (inter alia) ineffective assistance: counsel coerced his plea by warning of racial bias in the system and refused to file his requested withdrawal motion.
- The Superior Court denied Rule 61 without an evidentiary hearing, finding (contrary to portions of the record) that Reed had rescinded his withdrawal request and that counsel did not perform deficiently.
- The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further fact-finding and an evidentiary hearing, holding (1) counsel must follow a defendant’s pre-sentencing instruction to file a withdrawal motion or seek leave to withdraw so the defendant may proceed pro se or with new counsel, and (2) Strickland governs Reed’s claims; the record required development.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counsel refused to file pre-sentencing motion to withdraw plea | Reed: counsel ignored his instruction to file a Rule 32(d) motion, depriving his autonomy and amounting to ineffective assistance | State/Trial Ct: counsel reasonably declined because no legal basis existed; defendant waived claim by not pressing it at sentencing | Court: A defendant controls objectives pre-sentencing; counsel must file the motion or move to withdraw so defendant can proceed pro se or with new counsel. Remand for factfinding on whether counsel ignored an unrescinded instruction and whether Scarborough factors were considered. |
| Alleged coercive advice about race made plea involuntary | Reed: counsel told him he would lose because of race, coercing him into pleading | State: counsel deny or assert they merely advised on jury makeup; trial court credited a general denial without a hearing | Court: Such advice, if given, would be objectively unreasonable and could satisfy Strickland prejudice; trial court erred by making a credibility finding without an evidentiary hearing — remand for hearing. |
| Applicable ineffective-assistance standard and need for hearing | Reed: constructive denial (Cronic) or at least Strickland; entitled to hearing | State/Trial Ct: apply Strickland; no hearing required because affidavit was sufficient | Court: Strickland applies (no total denial of counsel here). But because key factual issues are undeveloped and trial court made unsupported findings, an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve both performance and prejudice prongs. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: performance and prejudice)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (presumption of prejudice only in narrow circumstances amounting to constructive denial of counsel)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (effective assistance right applies in plea‑bargaining context)
- Scarborough v. State, 938 A.2d 644 (Del. 2007) (sets factors trial court must consider on pre‑sentencing plea withdrawal)
- Taylor v. State, 213 A.3d 560 (Del. 2019) (defendant’s autonomy over plea decisions; counsel may not override defendant’s fundamental choices)
- Sanchez‑Barreto v. United States, 93 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (plea‑withdrawal hearings are a critical stage requiring effective counsel)