REED v. STATE, 373 P.3d 118

Defendant Robert Lee Reed was convicted by a jury in Tulsa County of Lewd Molestation and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment plus post‑imprisonment supervision.
The prosecution admitted a videotaped forensic interview of the child victim (State's Exhibit 12); the jury was later given the DVD and a laptop/TV to view it during deliberations.
Defense counsel did not object to the jury taking the DVD into deliberations; Reed raised three issues on appeal: (1) plain error from allowing unfettered jury access to the forensic interview; (2) denial of a jury instruction that conviction would require sex‑offender registration; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object.
The Court analyzed whether the recorded forensic interview constituted recorded testimony (triggering Martin/§894 safeguards) or merely an exhibit, and concluded it was the equivalent of recorded testimony.
Although the trial court erred by allowing the videotaped forensic interview into the jury room without complying with Martin/§894, the Court found the error harmless given strong independent corroboration (witness discovery, SANE exam injuries consistent with the victim’s account) and affirmed the conviction.
The Court also held that sex‑offender registration is a collateral regulatory consequence (not part of the statutory range of punishment) and need not be included in jury instructions; the ineffective‑assistance claim failed for lack of prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Reed)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether permitting the jury to take the victim's forensic interview DVD into deliberations was plain error	Unfettered access allowed repeated viewing of recorded testimony, causing undue emphasis and prejudicing the jury	The recording was an exhibit; trial court acted within discretion and any error was harmless	The interview was equivalent to recorded testimony and should not have gone to the jury without Martin/§894 safeguards, but the error was harmless — no relief granted
Whether jury should have been instructed that conviction triggers sex‑offender registration	Jurors needed to know practical consequences (registration) to understand true punishment	Registration is collateral regulatory consequence outside the sentencing range and not a matter for jury instruction	Denied — SORA registration is not part of the statutory punishment and is not a salient feature requiring instruction
Whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the videotape being given to the jury	Failure to object was deficient and reasonably likely to affect outcome by permitting undue emphasis on the tape	Any deficiency did not prejudice Reed because evidence independently corroborated conviction and sentence was minimum	Denied — even if performance was deficient, no Strickland prejudice shown

Martin v. State, 747 P.2d 316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (videotaped testimony equivalent to testimony; replay to jury requires in‑court inquiry and weighing under §894)
Davis v. State, 885 P.2d 665 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (distinguishing taped testimony from taped exhibits; taped testimony may not go with jury)
Stouffer v. State, 147 P.3d 245 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (reaffirming rule that taped testimony may not go to jury; taped exhibits may)
Levering v. State, 315 P.3d 392 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (plain error standard requires error, plainness, and effect on substantial rights)
Grissom v. State, 253 P.3d 969 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) (error must cause injury to warrant reversal)
Starkey v. Okla. Dept. of Corrections, 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) (holding registration provisions may raise Ex Post Facto concerns; cited but distinguished)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)