Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp.
915 F.3d 473
7th Cir.2019Background
- Linda Reed, who has tardive dyskinesia and other disabilities and uses a Dynavox speech device, was admitted to Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital in March 2012 and alleges multiple incidents of disability discrimination during a four‑day stay (notably being denied her Dynavox, placed in a seclusion room, and later attempting suicide).
- Reed sued under Title III of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Wisconsin patients’‑rights statutes; district court granted summary judgment to the hospital, dismissing federal claims and declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- The district court accepted the hospital’s Title III religious‑exemption defense (42 U.S.C. § 12187) even though the hospital raised that defense for the first time in its summary‑judgment papers after discovery had closed.
- The district court also granted summary judgment against Reed on her Rehabilitation Act claims, finding the seclusion decision was motivated in part by non‑disability factors.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed: it held the hospital forfeited/waived the unpleaded religious‑exemption defense (abuse of discretion to consider it at summary judgment) and found genuine factual disputes on Reed’s Rehabilitation Act claims precluded summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title III religious‑exemption defense was waived/forfeited when first raised at summary judgment | Reed: hospital failed to plead defense in its answers and thus plaintiff was unfairly ambushed after discovery closed | Hospital: defense need not be pled earlier and plaintiff had notice from deposition and public materials | Court: defense was an affirmative defense that should have been pleaded; district court abused discretion in considering it at summary judgment (defense forfeited) |
| Whether hospital falls within Title III exemption (entities "controlled by religious organizations") | Reed: insufficient timely notice and factual record; control not established on record before summary judgment | Hospital: corporate structure and governance documents show Catholic control sufficient for exemption | Court: did not decide exemption merits on full record; remanded because defense was forfeited and could not be considered at summary judgment |
| Whether Reed established intentional discrimination under Rehabilitation Act (sole‑cause requirement) for seclusion incident | Reed: factual disputes (did not scream) permit a jury to find seclusion solely because of disability | Hospital: seclusion was motivated at least in part by disruptive conduct (spilling coffee, lying on floor, screaming) | Court: material facts disputed; Reed did not concede disruptive conduct that precipitated seclusion; reverse summary judgment and remand |
| Whether Reed stated a failure‑to‑accommodate claim under Rehabilitation Act (withholding Dynavox and other acts) | Reed: withholding Dynavox and other denials constitute failure to provide reasonable accommodations and meaningful access | Hospital: actions were clinical/behavioral decisions and not solely disability‑based; argued no sole‑cause liability | Court: sufficient factual dispute and lack of hospital argument that withholding Dynavox was legitimate medical judgment; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012) (distinguishes waiver and forfeiture for unpleaded defenses)
- Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) (affirmative defenses based on facts peculiarly within defendant's control)
- Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997) (failure to plead affirmative defense can constitute waiver when it unduly prejudices plaintiff)
- Winforge, Inc. v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 691 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2012) (when defenses not listed in Rule 8(c) must nonetheless be pleaded)
- Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (Rehabilitation Act requires reasonable modifications to ensure meaningful access)
- Whitaker v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health Servs., 849 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing ADA mixed‑motive claims from Rehabilitation Act's sole‑cause standard)