Reed, Rodney
WR-50,961-07
Tex. App.—WacoApr 8, 2015Background
- Applicant Rodney Reed, a death-row inmate, filed a successive habeas application asserting actual innocence and constitutional violations based on new forensic opinions, recantations/clarifications by State experts, and newly discovered witness affidavits.
- Key forensic developments: retired NYPD Det. Sgt. Kevin Gannon identified decomposition and lividity signs suggesting an earlier time of death and post-mortem movement of the body; independent pathologists (Spitz, Baden, Riddick) agree the State’s timeline/theories are medically unsupportable.
- Two State experts (Dr. Bayardo and Meghan Clement) now provided statements altering or qualifying trial testimony about time of death, presence/age of semen, and anal injury; the applicant contends those recantations render prior testimony false or misleading.
- New witness affidavits (co-workers and a cousin of the victim) corroborate a consensual relationship between Reed and Stacey Stites, undermining the State’s theory that Reed abducted and murdered her in the early-morning hours.
- Procedural posture: Reed asks the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to reject the State’s motion to dismiss the application as abusive, arguing his claims fit within Article 11.071 §5(a)(1) (new law/newly available evidence) and §5(a)(2) (innocence gateway), and also rely on Article 11.073 (new science) and Ex parte Chabot (false testimony doctrine).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Reed) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held / Relief Sought |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Elizondo-type actual-innocence claims fit Article 11.071 §5(a)(2) | Elizondo’s due-process standard parallels §5(a)(2)’s "no rational juror" test, so Elizondo claims satisfy the statutory innocence gateway | §5(a)(2) should not be read to cover Elizondo claims because Elizondo isn’t a trial-error constitutional claim | Court urged to accept that Elizondo claims are reviewable under §5(a)(2) (relief sought: remand for evidentiary hearing) |
| Whether §5(a)(2) requires new evidence to have been factually unavailable with due diligence | §5(a)(2) codifies Schlup and requires only that reliable new evidence was not presented at trial; no separate factual-unavailability/diligence showing is required | State argues an implied diligence/factual-unavailability requirement (citing dicta) should bar §5(a)(2) review | Court urged to reject adding a diligence requirement to §5(a)(2) and to consider Reed’s new evidence under the innocence gateway |
| Proper procedural vehicle for Article 11.073 (new science) claims | Article 11.073 claims meet §5(a)(1) legal/factual unavailability and §5(a)(2) innocence gateway standards because 11.073 requires new-science proof and a showing by preponderance that applicant would not be convicted | State resists, implying procedural disallowance or that evidence is not new/scientific enough | Court urged to treat 11.073 claims as meeting §5(a)(1)/(a)(2) standards and grant review/remand |
| Whether false or misleading testimony by State experts (Bayardo, Clement, Blakley, Smithey) violates due process | Trial expert testimony and prosecutor argument gave false or misleading impressions (on time of death, post-coital interval, anal injury, and future dangerousness); new recantations and expert affidavits meet Ex parte Chabot/Chavez/Weinstein standards for §5(a)(1) review | State contends the trial testimony was technically accurate, admissible, or at most a Rule 702/admissibility issue, not a due-process error; moves to dismiss as abusive | Reed seeks evidentiary hearing and reversal; asks Court to hold the expert testimony violated due process and warrants relief (remand requested) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (Due Process actual-innocence standard: clear and convincing evidence that no rational juror would convict)
- Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (discussing §5(a)(2) codification of Schlup and prior consideration of Reed’s claims)
- Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (recognizing unknowing use of false testimony as a basis for habeas review)
- Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (false testimony due-process framework)
- Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (even technically correct testimony can violate due process if it gives a false impression)
- Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (false testimony violates due process when reasonably likely to influence jury)
- House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (U.S. 2006) (Schlup standard summarized: new evidence must raise sufficient doubt that any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt)
- Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (trial court as gatekeeper under Rule 702; reliability of expert testimony)
- Ex parte Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (addressing unreliable expert evidence in habeas context)
- Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1987) (statutory construction: avoid readings that render terms meaningless)
