Reed, Rodney
AP-77,054
| Tex. App. | Feb 23, 2015Background
- Rodney Reed was convicted of capital murder (1998) for the abduction, rape, and strangulation of Stacey Stites; death sentence affirmed on direct appeal.
- Reed filed a Chapter 64 post-conviction motion (DNA testing) after years of state and federal habeas litigation; motion filed the same day the State sought an execution date.
- Motion sought testing of many items (33+), including swabs, clothing, belt fragments, beer cans, condom, and assorted paper items; Reed’s filings and hearing testimony repeatedly changed and expanded the list and the specific sampling locations.
- Trial evidence included semen and intact sperm in vaginal/rectal swabs and a DNA profile from those samples that matched Reed; other items had been previously tested at trial or in related proceedings.
- Trial court denied the Chapter 64 motion, finding Reed failed to prove (1) by a preponderance that exculpatory DNA results would have prevented conviction, (2) the request was not made to unreasonably delay execution/administration of justice, (3) chain of custody and existence of biological material for many items were inadequate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Reed) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency/specificity of Chapter 64 motion (items & tests) | Reed: motion and experts identified DNA techniques and items warranting testing; trial court should permit testing. | State: motion lacked statutorily required specificity (which items, which locations, which tests; many items added at hearing), so court properly denied testing. | Trial court did not err — Reed’s requests were insufficiently specific and inconsistent. |
| Whether exculpatory-result presumption requires assuming third‑party/CODIS match | Reed: court should presume exculpatory results mean presence of a third‑party (known offender) on tested items. | State: exculpatory means excluding the defendant as donor; assuming a CODIS match is improper and would essentially guarantee testing. | Court (following precedent) applies presumption that exculpatory means exclusion of defendant, not automatic third‑party/CODIS hit. |
| Whether Reed proved by preponderance he would not have been convicted with exculpatory results | Reed: absence of his DNA on contested items (belt, nametag, clothing, fingernails, etc.) would have undermined guilt. | State: jury already knew some items lacked Reed’s DNA; key inculpatory evidence (semen in body cavities, DNA matching Reed) would remain; absence on peripheral items would not, by preponderance, change verdict. | Trial court’s finding upheld — Reed failed to show exculpatory results would likely have prevented conviction. |
| Whether the Chapter 64 motion was filed to unreasonably delay execution | Reed: no statutory filing deadline; filed before execution date was formally set; not an intentional delay. | State: Reed waited many years after Chapter 64 enactment/amendment and after federal proceedings concluded; filing timing, breadth, litigation history, and ever-changing requests show purpose to delay. | Trial court’s finding of unreasonable delay supported by record and affirmed. |
| Chain of custody for items held by Bastrop District Clerk | Reed: items are available; testing possible. | State: exhibits were handled ungloved by many people, stored commingled without protective packaging — evidence may have been tampered with/ materially altered. | Trial court correctly found Reed failed to prove adequate chain of custody for many clerk‑held items. |
| Existence of biological material on non‑per se items | Reed: expert testimony and probabilities support that touch/skin‑cell DNA likely exists on items. | State: experts conceded only testing can prove biological material; trial evidence often showed no evidentiary stains; mere probability insufficient under statute. | Trial court properly found Reed failed to prove presence of biological material for many non‑per se items. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Swearingen, 424 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (defines exculpatory results as excluding defendant; rejects presumption that testing must assume a CODIS/known-offender match)
- Holberg v. State, 425 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (trial court cannot consider post‑trial evidence when deciding whether exculpatory DNA results would have changed the outcome at time of trial)
- Blacklock v. State, 235 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (exculpatory results are those that exclude the movant as donor; relevant where victim’s attacker was donor)
- Esparza v. State, 282 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (rejects assuming presence of third‑party DNA when evaluating hypothetical impact of exculpatory results)
- Dinkins v. State, 84 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (movant must clearly identify what evidence is sought; vague or expanded requests at hearing can support denial)
- Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (appellate courts generally cannot consider factual assertions outside the trial record or affidavits first presented on appeal)
- Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (an ‘‘item’’ for testing may be a portion/location of an object; movant must identify specific locations when item is not per se biological)
- Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (movant must show that exculpatory DNA results would, by preponderance, have prevented conviction; granting testing that only ‘‘muddies the waters’’ is not required)